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ABSTRACT 
Increasing instability in the Northeast Asian region, decreasing faith in the U.S.-
Japan security alliance, and the growing Chinese presence in the Northeast Asian region 
have caused Japanese politicians to revisit an issue that has been discussed three times in 
their history. The current issue is that, based on the above factors, Japan is once again 
considering whether or not the advantages of becoming a nuclear power outweigh the 
advantages of remaining a non-nuclear state. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze Japan’s previous attempts to develop a 
nuclear weapons program, looking at the political, economic/technological, and social 
factors that each time produced a non-nuclear state. The intention of the historical 
analysis is to provide a comprehensive understanding of how and why such critical 
factors led Japan to abstain from developing a nuclear weapons program. Additionally, 
the historical analysis will help determine the conditions that will likely drive current and 
future policy makers and leaders as they are faced with new incentives to develop nuclear 
weapons and, more importantly, suggest methods through which the United States and 
the international community can help ensure that Japan will continue to remain on a non-
nuclear-weapons course. 
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I. THE NUCLEAR WILL OF JAPAN 
A. PURPOSE 
 Increasing instability in the Northeast Asian region, decreasing faith in the U.S.-
Japan security alliance, and the growing Chinese presence in the Northeast Asian region 
have caused Japanese politicians to revisit an issue that has been discussed three previous 
times in their history. The current issue is that, based on the above factors, Japan once 
again is considering whether or not the advantages of becoming a nuclear power 
outweigh the advantages of remaining a non-nuclear state. Affecting Japanese leaders in 
this decision is the historical precedent established from the three previous occasions 
when Japan considered developing and rejected a nuclear weapons program.1 The 
decision that Japanese politicians make today will not only affect Japan, but will also 
have a significant impact on the region and the international community. 
 Do the decisions made in the past apply to the situation that Japan faces today? 
Japanese politicians such as the former Foreign Minister Taro Aso reject this linkage, 
saying that past policies that led to the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free Japan are 
no longer relevant. Their argument is based on a number of factors that by themselves 
would not necessarily propel Japan into the nuclear weapons club, but together fuel 
current debates.2 However, other Japanese leaders do not agree with former Minister Aso 
and argue that the established security partnership provided by the U.S.-Japanese security 
alliance sufficiently addresses a growing Chinese presence in the region and instability 
from North Korea. Additionally, those that speak out against the former Foreign Minister 
argue that the U.S.-Japanese security relationship ensures that Japan continues to affirm 
                                                 
1 The historical precedents come in the form of a constitution that prohibits the creation of a nuclear 
weapons program, security treaties made with the United States, and the participation in such organizations 
as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
2 The following five factors fuel current debates: (1) Japan now possesses the economic and 
technological capability to develop its own nuclear weapons program; (2) the current U.S.-Japanese 
strategic arrangement – the nuclear umbrella – has holes; (3) nuclear weapons would provide Tokyo with 
the tools necessary to become a global superpower; (4) China’s increasing global influence; and (5) nuclear 
instability within the region. 
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its position within the international community politically and economically.3 Will the 
decisions that have prevented Japan from developing a nuclear weapons program in past 
form the policies for continued abstinence in the future? Or will Japan set a new 
precedent as it attempts to deal with these issues on a level that is commensurate with its 
economic and political position within the international community and the emerging 
threats it faces? 
 The purpose of this thesis is to analyze Japan’s current nuclear debate in the 
context of previous attempts to develop a nuclear weapons program, looking at the 
political, economic/technological, and social factors that determined why and how certain 
critical factors led to the rejection of the nuclear option and how these issues fit into 
today’s policy deliberations. Some of the contributing factors that led Japan down the 
non-nuclear road in the past were: the creation of a constitution that prohibited the 
development of an offensive military program; state goals focusing on rapid economic 
industrialization; and the establishment of a relationship that promoted the achievement 
of these goals. The argument of this thesis is that the incentives to develop a nuclear 
weapons program today do not outweigh the disincentives that would result in pursuing 
said action. Therefore, despite new pressures, Japan’s future policies are likely to 
continue to be shaped by decisions that have been made in the past and the debates of 
today will not produce a nuclear Japan for tomorrow. Similar to its previous attempts, 
Japan’s quest for a nuclear weapons program carries with it too many consequences and 
will only exacerbate the issues that drive the debates calling for change. 
In order to support the argument, this thesis first provides a historical analysis of 
the three previous times Japan considered developing nuclear weapons. These periods 
were: (1) the mid-1960’s, following the Chinese nuclear test; (2) the mid-1970’s, 
following Japan’s ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and (3) the mid-
1990’s, following Japan’s agreement to of the indefinite extension to the NPT. The 
intention of the historical analysis is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
critical factors that led Japan to abstain from developing a nuclear weapons program. 
                                                 
3 Daily Summary of Japanese Press. Office of Translation and Media Analysis. 05 December 2006. 
These four issues have been argued by such senior officials as former Foreign Minister Taro Aso in an 
interview translated in the Office of Translation and Media Analysis. 
 3
Additionally, the historical analysis will help determine what will likely drive current 
policy makers and leaders as they are faced with new incentives to develop nuclear 
weapons and more importantly, help suggest methods through which the United States 
and the international community can ensure that Japan will abstain from developing 
nuclear weapons. 
B. RECENT BACKGROUND 
 In July of 2006, North Korea launched three Taepodong-2 missiles, two of which 
landed just short of Northwest Japan.4 This missile launch concluded a six-hour test that 
caused the international community to question the security and stability of the Far East 
region. Not only did Asian regional leaders condemn the testing, but they commenced a 
series of talks and negotiations aimed at ensuring it did not happen again. More 
importantly, the debate over whether or not Japan’s current security alliances and 
defenses were adequate against renewed North Korean instability resurfaced. As a result, 
the possibility for the development of nuclear weapons seems more real today than it ever 
has in the past. However, unlike in the past, Japan now possesses large stocks of civilian 
plutonium and new reprocessing facilities that could be used to support such efforts. 
 In order to help understand what fuels the current debates, one must also 
understand the theoretical reasons that might propel Japan to develop nuclear weapons. 
Scholars have addressed these questions from the perspective of four conceptual 
paradigms—neo-realism, classical realism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism. The 
importance of looking at these paradigms is partly because they can help explain why 
Japan failed to develop nuclear weapons in the past. But more importantly, for the 
purposes of this thesis, some of the paradigms possess predictive power that could assist 
policy makers in determining what Japan might do in the future. 
1. Neo-realism 
Neo-realism is the theoretical perspective employed by its originator Kenneth 
Waltz and by John Mearsheimer to explain how states were likely to try to ensure their 
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security as the world transitioned from the bipolar system of the Cold War to a new 
multipolar structure.5 Both argued that once the Cold War was over, the spheres of 
influence that the United States and the Soviet Union presided over would eventually 
erode and the states ruled inside those spheres could eventually become independent, 
multilateral players.6 Because Japan had become an integral member of the international 
community, it would feel compelled to create a military force to complement and 
maintain its economic and political standing. This would by necessity include nuclear 
weapons. 
Another neo-realist, Chris Layne, argued that the end of the Cold War would 
produce a unipolar structure where the United States was the hegemonic state.7 In this 
world, Japan would only be allowed to re-militarize or create a nuclear weapons program 
if the United States allowed it. This theory is based on Waltz’s notion that states will 
bandwagon with existing powers to ensure their survival.8 The correlation for Layne 
resides in the fact Japan remains attached to the United States following the post-Cold 
War period. The U.S.-Japan security treaty and its ability to provide Japan with continued 
security and safety should prevent Japanese leaders from developing nuclear weapons 
despite a changed international structure, at least as long as unipolarity lasts. However, 
Layne’s predictions are less sanguine about Japan’s non-nuclear status should conditions 
of multipolarity emerge. 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 “Press Briefing on North Korea Missile Launch,” The Whitehouse.gov, 04 July 2006, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060704-1.html (accessed 18 October 2007). 
5 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 156-7. 
6 Bruce M. Russett, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future, Part III: 
Realism and the Realities of European Security,” International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter, 1990-1991): 
216. 
7 “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,” Layne, 
Christopher. Project Muse: Scholarly Journals Online, 2006, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html (accessed: 18 October 2007). 
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 128.  
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2. Classical-realism 
Classical realism assumes that states are unitary actors that seek to maximize their 
power in order to survive in an anarchical international system.9 If the rivals in the 
international system are developing nuclear weapons, the states facing this external 
pressure are likely to do the same. Additional factors that would propel Japan towards the 
development of a nuclear weapons program according to this framework are: (1) the 
quest for normalcy; (2) the breakdown of the U.S.-Japan security alliance; (3) fear of the 
increasing Chinese political, social, economic, and military presence in the region; and 
(4) a reaction to the missile developments and atomic bomb test by North Korea.10 
Supporters of these arguments believe that nuclear weapons are essential for the 
continued protection of Japan’s vital interests, which in turn will ensure their survival. 
However, classical realism fails to take into account the domestic political, social, and 
economic influences on the Japanese decision-making apparatus. But it has been the 
intricate relationship between these three domestic factors that has prevented Japan from 
developing nuclear weapons in the past and will likely continue to prevent Japan from 
developing them in the future.  
The 1951 Security Treaty and then the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security between the United States and Japan have provided security since the end of the 
occupation to present. Since the end of the occupation, Japan has evolved into a global 
economic force. Even though it eventually possessed the ability to develop nuclear 
weapons it decided not to because Tokyo thought it better to continue to develop Japan’s 
economy. If Japan were to develop nuclear weapons, the fear was that it would damage 
trade relations with more powerful countries that did not want to see a nuclear Japan.11 
                                                 
9 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 
1995): 72. 
10 Sentaku Shuppan. United States Embassy, Tokyo. Daily Summary of Japanese Press. Office of 
Translation and Media Analysis. 05 December 2006. These four issues have been argued by such senior 
officials as Foreign Minister Taro Aso in an interview translated in Sentaku Shuppan newspaper.  
11 The concerns extend beyond the fear of jeopardizing trade relations. For example, Japan’s 
relationship within the NPT was also a concern. Membership within the NPT increases stable relations with 
China and maintains stable relations with the United States. NPT membership also provides Japan with 
access to materials and technology needed to fuel their civilian nuclear power program. 
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Instead of diverting funds that would benefit economic advancement of the state and risk 
ruining international relationships, Japan continued to depend on the United States for 
security. Although Japan currently possesses the economic and technological means to 
develop and deploy nuclear weapons, political majorities continue to support a defense 
policy based on the current U.S.-Japanese security relationship.  
3. Neo-liberalism 
Neo-liberalism posits that the economic and political interests of the state 
influence the behavior and outcome of a situation; therefore, the interest of a state is to 
establish and maintain stable relations with the international community.12 A state 
establishes stability by cooperating with core states because the costs of 
defection/conflict are too great. Glenn Chafetz claims these alignments are achieved by 
the relationship between core states and the periphery states (or smaller states) because of 
the quest for individual state security. Core states are led by democracies that bond with 
other core states and operate under established norms and values. The periphery or 
smaller states then accept the established norms and values because they guarantee their 
national security and promote their prosperity. He explains that states that are part of this 
relationship provide a more secure environment because states are able to achieve their 
interests through international cooperation, in lieu of an arms race.13  
Additionally, neo-liberals argue that the economic and political costs are too great 
to develop a nuclear weapons program to deter regional threats. This is because such a 
program would undermine the norms and values established and directed by international 
institutions like the NPT and the U.N. and make the state an international pariah. 
Similarly, Yan Xuetong, the deputy head of the Institute of International Studies at 
Tsinghua University, described future Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda as a neo-liberal 
                                                 
12 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1989), 5. 
13 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the 
Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1996): 49. Core states are described as those 
states that maintain power and influence over another state. The United States is an example of a core state. 
This argument is somewhat similar to Waltz’s bandwagoning theory, already discussed in this chapter. 
Chafetz’s position is assessed in  
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for solving the country’s problems through the negotiation of established laws and 
treaties.14 However, the NPT, and its inability to actually control non-proliferation within 
the international community causes much concern amongst Japanese elites.15  
Examples of the NPT’s failure to control states from developing nuclear programs 
are India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have been permitted to possess nuclear 
weapons programs without having to sign the NPT because of their relationship with the 
United States. On the other hand, Iran continues to develop its program in spite of threats 
from the non-proliferation regime. Regionally, and of particular concern to Japan, has 
been North Korea’s unwillingness since 2003 to remain a partner of the NPT and cease 
its development of a nuclear weapons program. Therefore, Japan’s decreasing faith in the 
NPT is caused by the preferential treatment towards aspiring nuclear states. Additionally, 
Japan has decreasing faith in the NPT’s inability to prevent or eliminate aspiring or 
established nuclear weapons programs. 
It is under these circumstances that neo-liberal Japanese decision makers might 
consider the development of a nuclear weapons program. As their faith in the non-
proliferation regime decreases, so too does their faith in the members that are a part of it, 
specifically the United States. If the NPT’s greatest superpower does not fully support the 
regime, then why should Japan? Japan signed onto the NPT with only five nuclear 
weapons states, not six, seven, or eight.16 
4. Constructivism 
Constructivism focuses on how a state’s interests and behavior are influenced by 
its identity and perceived place in the international community as developed and affected 
                                                 
14 “Japan’s Parliament Elects Fukuda Prime Minister,” The China Daily, 26 September 2007, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?risb=21_T2257768053&format=
GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T2257768056&cisb=22_T2257768055&
treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=227171&docNo=2 (accessed 12 October 2007). 
15 Asahi Shimbun Company. United States Embassy, Tokyo. Daily Summary of Japanese Press. 
Office of Translation and Media Analysis. 05 November 2006. 
16 Maria Rost Rublee, “Persuasion, Social Conformity, and Identification:  Constructivist 
Explanations for Non-Nuclear States in a Nuclear World,” PhD. dissertation. Columbian College of Arts 
and Sciences of The George Washington University, 2004, 115. 
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by its interactions with other states.17 The interests of the states are therefore influenced 
by both its self-image and by “internationally held norms and understandings about what 
is good or appropriate.”18 These international norms are defined as those identities, 
interests, and social realities and expectations that bound the rational interactions among 
the states in the international community.19 
The constructivist theoretical approach focuses on two arguments. The first 
pertains to the identity of the Japanese people. Japan has been the only society to 
experience and live through the effects of a nuclear weapons attack. Because of this fact, 
Japanese society has developed an anti-nuclear sentiment in hopes of preventing the same 
tragedy from occurring again. The strength of this sentiment stems from a Japanese 
political apparatus that continues to assimilate the emotional factors of its society into 
policy by choice.20 The strength of the Japanese identity is that it has strayed little in the 
past sixty years and, despite the external and internal influences that prompt change, it 
will unlikely change in the near future. 
But the second policy debate contained within the constructivist theory argues 
that the international community is full of uncertainty and is always changing—that 
norms are not always constant. Additionally, the norms that bind actors are not always 
relevant to evolving situations; therefore, it is only natural that states’ definitions of 
interests may evolve to adapt to changing environment. This side argues that the 
international community has slowly changed to accept nuclear weapons and that this 
changing attitude has the potential to change established norms.21 This argument is 
                                                 
17 Martha Finnemore, National Interest in International Society (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 3. 
18 Finnemore, 2. 
19 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 28. 
20 Andrew L. Oros, “Godzilla’s Return: The New Nuclear Politics in an Unsecure Japan,” Benjamin 
L. Self and Jeffery W. Thompson, eds. Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st 
Century Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, 5. 
21 Sharon Squassoni, India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views. Washington DC: CRS 
Report for Congress, 2006, CRS, RL33292, 17. 
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supported by the international community’s inability to prevent such countries as Isreal, 
India, Pakistan, and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.22  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEBATES 
 As this thesis will show, a main factor that prevented Japan from developing 
nuclear weapons was its lack of motivation. However, the new debate raises serious 
concerns throughout the international community because Japan now possesses the 
technological, economic and material means to develop its own nuclear weapons 
program. More importantly, the current debate shows that a large part of the Japanese 
political and social structure displays the motivation to prompt change. This is evident as 
the Japanese are now discussing a change to Article Nine of their constitution to allow for 
their Self-Defense Forces to take a more proactive role throughout the region. 23 In the 
past, the nuclear taboo preventing these discussions from occurring so openly—perhaps 
the nuclear taboo is now fading away. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
 The three specific time periods of 1960-1965, 1970-1976, and 1993-2007 were 
chosen because they covered the instances when Japan has been faced with the same 
question—whether or not to develop nuclear weapons. Although the first two time 
periods produced a non-nuclear Japan, the reasons leading to each respective decision 
were not always dictated by the same set of factors. However, the issues fueling today’s 
debate revisit many of the factors that influenced policy makers in the past, but today 
there are some significant differences. The biggest difference is that, in the past, Japan 
lacked the technological, economical, political, or social motivation. Not only does Japan 
                                                 
22 Although Iran has yet to attain nuclear weapons, the international community has yet to effectively 
prevent Iran from continuing to develop them. Additionally, the international community has also shown 
favor in who it accepts as a nuclear power. For example, the recent nuclear agreement between the United 
States and India has placed India in the favor of the international community despite not being a member of 
the NPT. 
23 “North Korea Assails Japan Over “Threat” in Defense White Paper,” British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 16 August 2006 
http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?risb=21_T2256777658&format=
GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T2256777661&cisb=22_T2256777660&
treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=2 (accessed 01 February 2007). 
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currently possess the technological and economic means to develop a nuclear weapons 
program, but the political debates are more open to consideration of nuclear weapons 
from within their own society and find greater support in the international environment 
today than ever before. 
E. ROADMAP 
 The current debate does not focus on whether or not Japan possesses the 
capability to develop nuclear weapons; instead, the debate centers on whether or not the 
will of the people will influence political leaders in the face of a threatening security 
environment. Chapters II through IV will analyze three case studies and specifically 
determine what political, economic/technological, and social factors persuaded, or might 
today persuade, Japanese leaders to refrain from developing a nuclear weapons program. 
 Chapter II will analyze the period from 1960 to 1965. The beginning of this case 
study will discuss Japan’s pre-World War II attempt to develop nuclear weapons. This 
initial attempt proved that Japan was capable of developing nuclear weapons and 
provided the fuel for future debates. The rest of the chapter concentrates on the how the 
United States accepted responsibility for the security of Japan. The middle stages of this 
period saw the initial shift of Japanese security and defense towards total reliance on the 
United States. The document signifying this event was the signing of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty of 1951. However, it was the signing of the 1961 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security that reaffirmed Japan’s submission to the United States for 
security issues and the Japan’s commitment instead to economic development. The 
period culminated with the Chinese atomic bomb test in 1964. 
 Chapter III analyzes the period from 1970 to 1976. During this period, Japan 
faced two sub-phases when it considered developing nuclear weapons. The first instance 
came after China detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1964. The explosion sent shock 
waves through the Japanese political and social arenas while placing China on the 
international stage. The second instance came when Japan was to sign the NPT in 1970. 
The effects of the Chinese nuclear bomb were evident, as the Japanese were hesitant to 
surrender their rights to develop their own nuclear weapons program. Subsequently, 
Japan did not ratify the treaty until 1976. Additionally, this period saw the establishment 
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of civilian Japanese nuclear facilities. This is significant because the Japanese civilian 
plants validated the claims that state Japan could easily translate its civilian technologies 
into a viable nuclear weapons program. 
 Chapter IV analyzes the period from 1993-2007. Again, this period has presented 
two instances where Japan has considered developing nuclear weapons. The first instance 
was when Japan was asked to agree to the indefinite extension of the NPT. Japan was 
hesitant to support the extension because it would lock them into an agreement that 
would restrict their ability to fully address the increasing instability stemming from North 
Korea. The second instance is the current debate once again centers on instability from 
North Korea since 1998, but also the increasing political, economic, and military 
presence of China in the region. 
 Chapter V is the conclusion, where this thesis will discuss trends based on the 
incentives and disincentives from each case study that prevented Japan from developing 
nuclear weapons in the past. These trends will then be applied to the future debates and 
be used to construct possible policy options to aid U.S. policy makers. This thesis will 
accomplish this through use of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources will 
consist of an interview with the former Director of the Japan Desk and translated press 
releases. The press releases and commentary come from past and current politicians, 
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II. CASE STUDY I: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY OF 
1960 TO 1965 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At the onset of World War II, the Japanese Army and Navy had initiated separate 
investigations to determine whether or not Japan possessed the capability to develop its 
own nuclear weapons program. The two services employed the services of Japanese 
scientists from Tokyo, Kure, and Osaka universities.24 The knowledge gained from the 
Japanese scientists was invaluable as they had either studied nuclear technology in the 
United States or Europe prior to World War II. This was significant because their 
knowledge of nuclear power convinced Japan’s leaders to continue with the plan to 
develop their own nuclear weapons program.25  
The first time Japan assessed its nuclear weapons capabilities was in 1943. 
Japan’s nuclear weapons development plan was divided into four groups: A, B, C, and D. 
Group A investigated particle accelerators and the effect of high velocity particles on 
nuclei. Group B studied cosmic rays because existing knowledge held that it was possible 
to detonate uranium-235 or plutonium-239 with cosmic rays. Group C focused on the 
theoretical studies and Group D focused on medical concerns.26 During the next two 
years, Japan was able to construct a cyclotron, the biggest outside of the United States, 
and a thermal diffusion plant. This was significant because the construction of a thermal 
diffusion plant gave Japan the ability to separate uranium-235 from uranium-238.27 
                                                 
24 Philip Henshall, The Nuclear Axis: Germany, Japan and the Atom Bomb Race, 1939-1945, 
(Gloucestershire, United Kingdom: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2000), 141. 
25 Ibid. Both the Army and Navy initiated separate investigations to determine whether or not Japan 
possessed the capability to develop its own nuclear program. The Navy had done so with the intentions of 
using it for the propulsion of its vessels. The Army, on the other hand, had intended to use nuclear power to 
develop offensive weapons. 
26 Ibid. Japan’s groups were similar in structure to Germany’s nuclear weapons development plan. 
27 Ibid. 
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Despite the transfer of nuclear technologies, material, and equipment from 
Germany, Japan was unable to produce an atomic bomb during World War II.28 Although 
Japan was able to construct vital pieces of equipment necessary to develop nuclear 
weapons, the constant fire bombings that occurred during 1945 destroyed nearly all of its 
nuclear facilities.29 The facilities, equipment, or materials that were not destroyed by the 
fire bombings were taken over by the Soviet Union. Coincidentally, the facilities the 
Soviets had captured proved very valuable as they used the stockpiled fuel for their own 
purposes.30 
During the period of 1945-1965, the international community witnessed the 
restructuring and evolution of the Northeast Asian region. Japan rebuilt its social, 
political, and economic structures to emerge as an economic superpower; war on the 
Korean Peninsula pushed the limits of the Cold War stalemate; and China became a 
nuclear weapons state. Because of these issues, Japanese politicians were forced to 
reconsider developing nuclear weapons. The question this chapter will assess is what 
were the factors that motivated Japan not to develop a nuclear weapons program? 
In order to answer the question, one must understand the factors that fueled the 
debates. Those who were against the remilitarization of Japan argued that it should not 
develop a nuclear weapons program because of newly created policies/principles that 
promoted the goals of rapid industrialization. Conversely, the side that argued for the 
development of nuclear weapons did so out of fear that the rising Chinese power would 
take over the region.31 
The central argument of this chapter is that the incentives to remain a non-nuclear 
power outweighed the incentives to develop a nuclear weapons program during this time. 
This decision was based on a series of political, social, and economic issues that 
influenced Japanese policy makers for decades to come, including the facts that: (1) the 
                                                 
28 Henshall, The Nuclear Axis: Germany, Japan and the Atom Bomb Race 1939-1945, 183. 
29 Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation (Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-Clio, Inc., 2008), 61. 
30 “Nuclear Weapons Program: Japan,” Federation of American Scientists, 16 April 2000 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke/ (accessed 12 March 2007). The Russians had captured Japanese 
mining facilities that were maintained in Northern Korea. 
31 Sadako Ogata, “Japanese Attitude toward China,” Asian Survey 5, no. 8 (August 1965): 389. 
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physical and psychological effects of 1945 bombs were still fresh in the Japanese psyche; 
(2) the constitution and other treaties/principles were focused on economic development; 
(3) Japan’s security responsibilities rested on the United States; and (4) Japan’s economy 
could not support the development of nuclear weapons. The main point of this chapter 
draws out the specific social, political, and economic factors that dissuaded Japan from 
developing nuclear weapons.   
B. POLITICAL FACTORS 
Post-World War II, Japan’s political structure was developed by external actors, 
specifically the United States, which emphasized the transformation of pre-war Japanese 
social, economic, and military structures. This was done through a series of treaties, 
policy directives, and economic reforms that ensured Japan would not re-militarize 
socially, much less develop a nuclear weapons program. As the period evolved so too did 
Japan’s apparent need to re-arm. However, the perceived need to re-arm was not evenly 
distributed through the Japanese political and public spheres and a series of debates 
ensued. The catalysts for the debates stemmed from a shuffle in the East Asian regional 
context as a communist government emerged to lead China in 1949 and allied forces used 
Japanese soil to support the Korean War in the early 1950’s. However, the debates 
reached a peak in 1964 when the Chinese tested its first nuclear bomb. This section will 
look at how specific treaties and post-war policies ensured that Japanese politicians 
would create and support future policies that guaranteed a continued non-militarized 
Japan. 
1. New Constitution 
When the Japanese surrendered on the deck of the U.S.S. Missouri on September 
2, 1945, they gave up their status as a military power and ended the reign of its 
totalitarian government.32 In its place, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers 
(SCAP) created the foundations for a revived democratic government by drafting a new 
                                                 
32 “Surrender of Japan, 02 September 1945 – Selected and Miscellaneous Views,” Naval Historical 
Center, 07 March 1999, http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/japansur/js-8.htm (accessed 2 
June 2007). 
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Japanese constitution. To accomplish this, SCAP’s draft constitution restructured the 
Japanese Diet so that complete governing control was placed within one entity. This was 
an improvement over previous systems where power was divided between the Diet, the 
cabinet, and the legislature. This division of power had allowed previous Japanese leaders 
to subvert established checks and balances; therefore, rendering them useless. After 
several provisions, Japan’s Diet ratified the constitution and accepted the new 
government. 
Another provision to the new constitution was Article 9. It stated that the 
“Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or 
use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” Furthermore, it stated that 
“land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”33 
Article 9 was significant because it was created by external actors—specifically SCAP. 
General Douglas MacArther, the leader of SCAP, and his staff created a constitution that 
removed the right for Japan to defend itself through re-armament or war. However, 
similar to how Japan was the first country to experience the atomic bomb, Japan was also 
the first country to renounce its warfare rights as a sovereign state. The Matsumoto 
committee was concerned about the implications of Article 9, but its post-war position, 
coupled with the Allied occupation and leadership control lying with SCAP, left Japan 
with no leverage to negotiate a more favorable deal. 
2. San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 
1951 
The SCAP organization was removed when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was 
signed in September 8, 1951. Subsequently, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed 
shortly thereafter. The security treaty provided the following provisions: (1) termination 
to the still-existent state of war; (2) withdrawal of occupational troops within ninety days; 
(3) restoration of Japan’s sovereignty; (4) a right to self defense; and (5) access to 
international markets.34 
                                                 
33 James L. McLain, Japan: A Modern History, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002), 
540. 
34 Ibid., 558. 
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The first implication was that Japan was no longer an occupied state directly 
under the supervision and control of the United States—because of the security treaty; the 
two countries were now allies. The Korean War was occurring at the same time the peace 
treaty was signed and now that Japan was a sovereign state it was expected to participate 
in international affairs. However, Japan did not possess a military and therefore it could 
only provide support to nations actively fighting in the war through use  
of its position in the region. Japan’s proximity to the Korean Peninsula, and to the Soviet 
Union and China, proved an invaluable staging point for U.N. and U.S. military 
projection of power.35  
The second implication was that the security of Japan now rested with the United 
States. Since Japan had already approved the construction of bases and use of port 
facilities by the United States, the transition of stationing troops was simplified. Although 
the primary purpose of maintaining U.S. forces on the islands was to preserve regional 
stability and contain the spread of communism, there also existed a secondary reason. 
The additional tasking of the U.S. forces was to serve under the direction of the 
government and act as local police force responsible for suppressing riots and 
disturbances.36 Finally, the security treaty also stated that Japan was not permitted to 
extend the same basing rights to third party countries without the consent of the United 
States. It was for these reasons that Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was able to 
concentrate on the development of the country’s social, political, and economic systems 
while effectively staying out of the war occurring on the Korean Peninsula. 
However, the peace and security treaties also served as the catalysts for the initial 
debates concerning the defense of Japan. The specific debates concerned whether or not 
Japan had really regained its sovereignty when it was now so reliant on the United States. 
Prime Minister Yoshida argued that the key for Japan to once again become a powerful 
country was not through the buildup of military forces but through rapid economic 
                                                 
35 James L. McLain, Japan: A Modern History, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002), 
558. The security partnership between the United States and Japan meant that the United States could 
construct bases and facilities to maintain a viable presence in the region to support the containment strategy 
aimed at the Soviet Union and communist China. 
36 Ibid., 557. 
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industrialization. To support his argument, he claimed that the alliance between the 
United States and Japan not only meant security guarantees, but also provided 
technological transfers, economic assistance, and access to the international markets. 
Furthermore, he argued that the alliance did not suppress Japan’s sovereignty, but 
provided mechanisms that ensured a source of military technology, defense assistance, 
and external political support for some level of rearmament. 37 
Unfortunately, Prime Minister Yoshida’s arguments had done little to quell 
opposing groups that claimed the security and peace treaties did little to restore Japan’s 
sovereignty. Although the Japanese supported the ideals of a peace and security treaty, 
they were concerned that Prime Minister Yoshida conceded too much to get them. In an 
effort to rally support, opposing groups often referred to Japan’s new sovereign status as 
one of “Subordinate Independence.” In 1952, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper conducted a 
poll that stated only 18% of society believe Japan was truly independent.38 
The opposing groups were concerned because the United States could operate 
without regard to Japanese interests. For example, if the United States were to attack a 
country from Japanese soil, the logical retaliatory tactic would be to directly attack Japan. 
Therefore, a partnership with the United States could inevitably drag Japan into war that 
was not based on Japanese interests, but American foreign policy. This fear was validated 
as polls reflected a decline in Japanese confidence in Prime Minister Yoshida’s ability to 
lead the country.  After a series of public outbursts directed towards the opposing group’s 
claims and accusations, he resigned from office in 1954. 
3. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
 Although Prime Minister Yoshida stepped down from office in 1954, he ensured 
his vision of creating a state that would economically and technologically transform how 
the current superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, influenced future 
Japanese leaders. This idea was formalized in what was known as the Yoshida doctrine 
                                                 
37 Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 12. 
38 McLain, Japan: A Modern History, 559. 
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and the basic premise called for a strong and unified alliance with the United States. The 
part of the revision that concerned the extension of security matters stated the following: 
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its 
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.39 
A strong alliance with the United States proved to be a key factor to Japan’s 
economic success. In an effort to take advantage of this fact, Prime Minister Kishi 
Nobusuke presented a revision to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. The purpose 
was to ensure that Japan would continue to economically industrialize by further 
solidifying its alliance with the United States. 
 The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security, drew the two countries closer together by removing the clauses giving the 
U.S. military a role in Japanese internal security and replaced them with mutual 
obligations.40 This meant that the U. S. forces were only responsible for protecting 
Japanese interests from external forces. This was accomplished by Japan agreeing to the 
construction of more bases and allowing more troops on the island. 
 Naturally, the thought of a treaty that would strengthen ties with the United 
States, as opposed to creating a treaty that would move Japan towards a state of true 
sovereignty, created a heated debate between Japanese politicians and the Japanese 
public. However, the difference between the two debates, over the 1951 peace treaty and 
the revision of the treaty in 1960, was the magnitude of dissent that came from the 
opposing groups. The violent protests that stemmed from the Japanese public influenced 
the Japanese Diet, as opposing groups within the political system staged similar protests. 




                                                 
39 Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why 
States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2004), 221. 
40 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, 14. 
 20
members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from entering the chamber to vote on 
the treaty.  The 1960 revision eventually passed through the Diet without the consent of 
the JSP.41 
 The significance of the debates that occurred as a result of the U.S.-Japan Security 
revision of 1960 was that subsequent prime ministers’ rhetoric centered on the continued 
economic development of Japan. For example, Japanese politicians understood that 
continued economic success would result only from a strong U.S.-Japan alliance. 
However, Prime Minister Kishi’s effort to get the 1960 revision through the Diet cost him 
his position because the Japanese public had seen the strengthening of ties with the 
United States as counter productive in its quest of normalization. Despite the strong 
opposition, Prime Minister Kishi continued to stress the importance of strengthening 
alliances with the United States and since the LDP, his party, dominated the House of 
Representatives, the 1960 revision passed through the Diet. His successor, Ikeda Hayato 
assumed control of the party in 1960 and his platform concentrated solely on furthering 
economic development. He went as far as promising the Japanese public that his policies 
would double Japan’s national income by the end of the next decade. His policies were 
able to accomplish this task in half the time.42 
The 1960 security treaty originated at a time when Japan’s economy was 
beginning its climb toward becoming the second largest economy in the world.43 As long 
as the Japanese leadership did not stray from ensuring this would occur, the Japanese 
public would continue to support them. This was evident as the LDP firmly controlled the 
Diet for the next four decades because of their concentrated efforts on economic 
industrialization. Even though the 1960 security revision focused on strengthening 
alliances with the United States, it implied that Japan could solely focus on economic 
development, thus keeping the Japanese public happy. 
                                                 
41 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, 14. According to Japanese law, if the Upper House of the Diet 
fails to vote on a specific issue within 30 days and the House of Representatives maintains a 2/3 majority 
vote, it will pass by default. 
42 Ibid., 15. 
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4. Political Implications of the Chinese Atomic Bomb Test 
China’s 1964 atomic bomb test and its implications for the international 
community were best summarized by a Slovak Communist Party statement, “The first 
experimental atomic bomb has been exploded in the Chinese desert, and above it, a cloud 
of problems opened in its wings.”44 The significance of the test, as it pertained to Japan, 
was that it prompted the Japanese leadership to openly discuss the need for the 
development of its own nuclear weapons program. This was the first time in the post-war 
period that these discussions occurred and this time serious consideration was made about 
the feasibility of its implementation. Despite interpretations that stated Japan was legally 
permitted to develop its own nuclear weapons program, it continued to abstain.45 This 
section will discuss the political reactions to the Chinese atomic bomb test and why the 
political system decided to abstain from developing nuclear weapons. 
Japan’s political decision not to develop a nuclear weapons program was based on 
two reasons. The first reason was due to the series of treaties that ensured Japan’s 
security through its alliance with the United States. Just a short time before the test, Japan 
resigned the 1951 Security Treaty to ensure the United States would continue to protect 
Japan against external aggressors by assuming responsibly for its security. This enabled 
Japan to assure the domestic population and the international community that it did not 
need to pursue actions independent of the United States’ policies. 
Additionally, the United States was adamant about Japan maintaining its non-
nuclear status because the China nuclear test had created a new series of problems that 
affected the international community. These problems included: (1) how Beijing was 
going to exploit its new weapon; (2) the Soviet Union’s response to the atomic test; and 
(3) if the United States was going to address the issue unilaterally or multilaterally with 
                                                 
44 Clemens Jr., “Chinese Nuclear Tests: Trends and Portents,” 111. 
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the Soviet Union.46 Therefore, the United States did not want to contend with Japan 
attempting to create its own nuclear weapons program. 
Fortunately, the Chinese government issued a series of statements that eased the 
international community’s concerns about its intentions to use nuclear weapons for 
defensive purposes only. This was accomplished by reiterating its support for a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and stating “that China will never, at any time, 
under any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons.”47 Additionally, the United 
States and the Soviet Union were convinced that China’s incipient nuclear program did 
not pose a threat to stability within the region. Therefore, it was by association that Japan 
was not to be concerned with China’s new nuclear weapons capabilities. 
The second reason Japan decided not to develop its own nuclear weapons 
program was its focus on economic development. At the time of the test, Japan had 
positioned itself toward becoming an essential player within the international economic 
markets and public sentiment ensured Japanese politicians would continue this trend. 
This fact was enforced when Prime Minister Sato stated, “Japanese public opinion will 
not permit this at present.” 48 Although Prime Minister Sato continued to say that he 
believed the public could be educated to understand the need for nuclear weapons, the 
overwhelming public opinion that favored economic progress over a major military 
buildup kept these statements from going public. 
C. ECONOMIC/TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS 
1. Economic Factors 
The social and political factors discussed earlier in this chapter created 
mechanisms that focused on the rapid industrialization of Japan’s economy, and show 
how the effectiveness of these mechanisms convinced Japanese political leaders that the 
benefits of concentrating on its economy outweighed the benefits of developing a nuclear 
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47 Ibid., 220. 
48 Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their 
Nuclear Choices, 222. 
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weapons program. The major economic reasons for Japan’s defeat during World War II 
are summarized as follows: (1) effective enemy submarine attacks against Japan’s 
commercial shipping and port facilities; (2) the weak resource position of Japan proper; 
(3) air attacks on reconstruction efforts during the war; and (4) weak administration and 
planning.49 These reasons were significant because they amplified the issues that 
Japanese political leaders needed to address as they attempted to rebuild a once strong 
economy. Additionally, Japan’s political leaders had to contend with its rural areas 
having to absorb the surplus of industrial workers whose jobs were lost after the war.50 
 Fortunately, the war had not affected the Japanese work ethic that before the war 
had created a Japanese economy that ranked among the world’s elite. Therefore, when 
occupational forces constructed an initial post-war infrastructure that let Japanese leaders 
focus on economic industrialization, the war torn country was rapidly transformed into an 
economic and technological leader. To accomplish this, Japan applied a pre-existing 
work ethic to evolving political, social, and economic structures. Japan focused on the 
establishment of a banking system that was used to channel resources towards industry 
that could quickly rebuild the country.51 It then carried out land reform targeting medium 
and big land ownership and encouraged labor movements that served to increase the 
labor’s share in the distribution of income. Finally, political leaders complemented 
Japan’s ability to sustain high savings rates and accumulate large amounts of capital by 
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These changes led to a national income increase of 11% from 1955 to 1956. 
During the same time period, the ratio of gross capital formation to gross national product 
was 30%.53 Japan was able to accomplish and sustain these growth rates for two reasons. 
The first reason was due to its relationship with the United States. Economically, the 
relationship gave Japan preferential access to the U.S. market and financial exchange 
through trade—it was no coincidence the United States was Japan’s biggest trade 
partner.54 
Japan continued to experience rising economic growth rates throughout the stated 
period. Although one can partly attribute the rapid economic gains to changes in the 
political mindset, it must be noted that the changes were prompted by the Japanese 
public. Japan’s social structure willingly accepted the shift from its military posture and 
eagerly directed its efforts towards the country’s new goals that concentrated on industry 
and technological development. Japan supported the increasing workforce demand by 
reallocating the population that originally migrated to the rural areas after the war back to 
the industrial centers of Japan. More importantly, Japan continued to support both the 
agricultural sector and the reforming industrial sectors. 
The successful results of Japan’s economic industrialization required a dedicated 
effort from both the political and social sectors. Japanese leaders knew the key to 
ensuring Japan’s continued upward economic trend required strengthening the existing 
alliance with the United States and maintaining a positive public psyche. Unfortunately, 
as the period evolved, it became nearly impossible to achieve a harmonious balance 
between the two. Despite that fact, Japanese leaders knew the alliance with the United 
States would provide security from external aggressors. This, in turn, enabled Japan to 
concentrate on its economic goals, preventing the Japanese public from pushing for a 
nuclear capability after China tested its atomic bomb in 1964. 
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2. Technological Factors 
Japan’s scarce resources and increasing industrial and economic power prompted 
the Japanese government to pursue alternative energy means. The leading candidate to 
meet these needs was nuclear power. However, the negative Japanese perception 
concerning the use of nuclear power, even for civilian purposes, caused a great deal of 
concern not only domestically, but also throughout the international community. This 
was because the nuclearization of Japan, even for civilian purposes, would provide it with 
fundamental building blocks to possibly develop a nuclear weapons program in the 
future. This section will look at the mechanisms put in place to ease public and 
international concerns relating to the civilian nuclearization of Japan. 
In December 1955, the Japanese government created the Atomic Energy Basic 
Law that stated “The research, development, and utilization of atomic energy shall be 
limited to peaceful purposes.”55 The objective of the law was to provide Japan with 
secure energy sources for the present and future. In order to gain international support for 
the use of nuclear power, Japan created numerous organizations that would fully 
cooperate with established international nuclear agencies. Two organizations in 
particular, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission, were 
directly under the control of the Prime Minister’s office. Therefore, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was assured that it would have no problems ensuring that 
Japan’s intentions to possess nuclear power were indeed for civilian purposes.56 
Surprisingly, domestic concerns about nuclear power were not that difficult to overcome. 
Most of the opposition emanated from the people that resided near the proposed 
construction sites.57 Aside from that, the Japanese public was not adverse to the use of 
nuclear power as long as it was for civilian purposes. 
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The significance of Japan’s acceptance of nuclear power for civilian purposes was 
not fully realized until recently. But for the purposes of the stated period, 1960-1965, the 
simple fact that Japan so eagerly turned to nuclear power as a primary source of energy 
proved that Japan’s negative perception towards nuclear power was not so firmly 
established. However, the peace and security treaties that were signed during the period, 
and the subsequent signing of a treaty that reaffirmed them during the later parts of the 
period, showed that the Japanese were still very much against the state re-militarizing or 
utilizing nuclear power for the development of weapons. 
D. SOCIAL FACTORS 
At the beginning of this period, the Japanese people gained the distinction of 
being the only country to experience a nuclear attack. In September 1953, Hugh M. 
Gloster was one of the first Americans tasked with analyzing Japan after the war. He was 
a Fulbright professor assigned to Hiroshima University post-detonation and his 
assignment was to analyze the physical and psychological effects of the bombs on 
Japanese society. His findings, coupled with a series of polls, proved that the physical 
and psychological effects of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki continued 
long after August 9, 1945. These effects formed perceptions that were very influential as 
Japan forced its first decision on whether or not to develop its own nuclear weapons 
program. 
1. Physical Destruction  
On his city tour, Gloster’s attention was first drawn to a “skeleton of a shattered 
steel and concrete structure” that was once Hiroshima’s proud Industrial Exhibition 
Hall.58 This building, as noted by the survivors he interviewed, was somehow spared 
from the devastation and remains today as a reminder of the destruction of the bomb. The 
survivors also recounted how the falling buildings, flying objects, and blast pressure 
killed thousands of people. They recounted walking through the town and seeing the 
faces of the dead bodies. The dead bodies were the lucky ones because the survivors now 
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had to figure out a way to rise out of the dust and rubble that once represented their 
highly industrialized city and infrastructure. Additionally, they had to deal with the long-
term physical effects of the radiation, something that no society knew how to deal with. 
2. Psychological Destruction 
The Japanese were able to quickly rebuild Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their 
respective infrastructures. However, the survivors noted that the blasts destroyed not only 
the buildings and infrastructure, but also the psyche of thousands of men, women, and 
children. The best example Gloster encountered came thanks to the insights of his 
mentor, Watanabe Kanae. Watanabe described how many of the Westerners perceived 
the “Japanese faces as Oriental masks which conceal all emotion.” 59 But, as Watanabe 
also noted, “concealing these emotions was something the Japanese were good at.”60 
However, Gloster was still able to detect the presence of pain and regret as he read a sign 
that was posted at one of the many memorial parks. It read: 
All earthly things are transient and of the thousands of buildings that met 
the same fate, this alone is now preserved to symbolize our wish that there 
may be No More Hiroshimas.61 
3. Public Perception 
To demonstrate how the physical and psychological effects of the bombs 
influenced Japan’s decisions seven years later, public opinion polls were conducted by 
the major newspapers. The polls showed how the Japanese public linked current 
offensive talk of war with the atrocities of what happened a decade earlier. Prompted by 
the Korean War, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper conducted a poll in 1952. It stated that 
only 38% of society favored the creation of a Self-Defense Force as a means to protect 
itself in the event the Korean War would expand to its shores. Of that 38%, 60% 
                                                 




consisted of post-war youth.62 The second question asked by the Asahi Shimbun 
specifically targeted the post-war youth. It asked what they would do if Japan was 
directly attacked, 41% of the Japanese youth said they would fight back, 11% said they 
would not fight, and 5% said they would flee.63 
Also during the Korean War, another series of polls were conducted asking if 
nuclear weapons should be used. Although 85% of Japanese wanted to end the war early, 
73% of them were opposed to the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the 73% broke 
down as follows: 55% considered nuclear weapons to be inhuman; 12% did not want to 
repeat Hiroshima/Nagasaki; 9% wanted to avoid human extermination; 5% feared nuclear 
weapons would result in World War III; and 3% objected to becoming the victim of a 
retaliatory attack.64 
These numbers should have been sufficient indicators of public perception as 
Japanese leaders attempted to make policy changes. Because of the physical destruction 
and psychological damage that occurred because of the bombs, it was no surprise that 
society was quick to remove political representatives that wanted to revise treaties or 
policies that were created to prevent a future Hiroshima or Nagasaki. In 1957, Prime 
Minister Kishi Nobusuke consolidated all liberal factions and created the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), at which point he became party president and Prime Minister. 
His primary focus as Prime Minister was to reinforce the security guarantees provided by 
the United States by presenting a revised treaty to the Japanese legislation. The revised 
treaty was prompted by the results of the Korean War, as Japan saw its responsibilities in 
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Japanese Diet, would have been sufficient to change public perception. However, this 
proved to be a lethal move, as Prime Minister Kishi and his cabinet were quickly 
removed from office.65 
Prime Minister Kishi thought the memories of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki no longer resided in the minds of Japanese. Additionally, he thought the 
Japanese that had direct experience with the war were gradually being replaced with the 
new post-war youth.66 However, the polls taken during the stated period showed that 
regardless of the age group that was emerging in Japanese society, the physical and 
psychological scars from World War II still influenced Japanese decisions. 
4. Public Perception of China’s Atomic Bomb Test 
The period from 1960-1965 began with a society that was faced with having to 
recover from the destruction caused by nuclear weapons. Because Japan was the only 
country that lived through the physical and psychological destruction of nuclear weapons, 
the population wanted to ensure the country would not have to go through such an ordeal 
again. This was evident when leading Japanese officials were quickly replaced by those 
that would attempt to modify the policies and treaties established to prevent Japan from 
re-militarizing—this also included the development of nuclear weapons.67 
Although it was nearly twenty years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki when China 
tested its first atomic bomb, the memories from August 1945 were still prevalent in the 
minds of the Japanese. Despite the obvious lack of public support for Japan to adopt any 
sort  of offensive capabilities, China’s atomic bomb test forced Japanese officials to 
consider the need for their own nuclear weapons program. Because this was the first time 
during the post-war period that these discussions had taken place, high-ranking Japanese 
officials were careful about not making the public aware of their possible intentions. 
Their concerns were based on two factors. 
                                                 
65 Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their 
Nuclear Choices, 221. 
66 Tanaka, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms,” 26. 
67 Ibid., 26. 
 30
The first factor was based on keeping Japan focused on improving the economy. 
At the time of the nuclear test, Japan had integrated itself as a vital participant within the 
international market economy. The Japanese public was not only proud of this 
accomplishment, but demanded their political leaders continue to direct Japan down this 
same path. This was evident when Japanese political leaders were quickly removed from 
office if their policies did support the goal of continued economic industrialization. 
The second factor was based on Japan’s “nuclear allergy.”68 The genesis of this 
term was based on the physical and psychological effects of the bombs dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and how they created an aversion towards the re-militarization 
of Japan. Naturally, this opinion opposed Japanese political leaders considering the 
development of a nuclear weapons program. The belief was that if Japan possessed 
nuclear weapons and if it were involved in another war, nuclear weapons would 
undoubtedly again be used against Japan. Therefore, if Japan’s political leaders possessed 
the means to carry out war, they would. This belief was framed by James Fallows: 
Japan seems unanimously and permanently convinced that the war led to 
catastrophe for the country. Moreover, the prevalent view in Japan is that 
the war was caused by a clique of semi-crazed militarists, who seized 
control of the country and forced everyone else into what was clearly a 
suicidal undertaking.69 
Based on the Japanese public’s concerted efforts towards the economic 
industrialization of its country, China’s atomic bomb test had succeeded in only causing 
debates amongst the Japanese politicians. The bomb had little to no effect on the 
Japanese public itself. Because the Japanese elite were aware of the public reaction that 
would result from developing a nuclear weapons program, they decided not to pursue the 
idea during this period. 
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The Chinese atomic bomb test in 1964 was the culminating factor that fueled 
debates as to whether or not Japan should develop a nuclear weapons program during the 
period from 1960-1965. These debates represented the first time since the end of World 
War II that Japan considered such an action. Despite Japan’s vital integration within the 
international economic markets, it was not yet prepared to assume the additional 
responsibilities of a state that possessed nuclear weapons. The purpose of this chapter 
was to determine why Japan decided not to develop a nuclear weapons program at the 
time. To answer that question, this chapter analyzed the period from 1960-1965 and 
determined that Japan’s social and political systems were structured to focus solely on the 
economic industrialization of the state. Japan was able to do this because of the U.S.-
Japan security alliance. 
To support this conclusion, this chapter showed that the end of World War II 
created a Japanese state that was physically and psychologically destroyed from both: (1) 
the firebombing campaigns against industrial nodes; and (2) the atomic bombs dropped 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This created an aversion to war within the psyche of the 
Japanese social system. The evidence of the pacifist anti-war sentiment was seen through 
the use of polls administered by major newspapers and the removal of political officials 
that strayed from the country’s targeted goals of economic industrialization. 
Politically, Japan created a structure that resurrected the once highly developed 
state. However, it was not without the assistance and eventual alliance with the United 
States. The assistance came in the form of financial aid, foreign investment, and advisory 
groups. The most significant group, SCAP, “assisted” Japan in the development of a new 
constitution that prevented the remilitarization of Japan. The allied occupation further 
assisted Japan in creating social, political, and economic structures that could take 
advantage of U.S. aid. 
The allied occupation evolved into an alliance between the United States and 
Japan in 1951, when the first of a series of treaties were signed. The San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty ended the allied occupation and restored 
Japan’s rights as a sovereign state. Additionally, the peace and security treaties made the 
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security of Japan the responsibility of the United States. This was significant for two 
reasons. The first was economic based, as Japan was able to fully concentrate on 
continued economic industrialization and fully integrate itself within the economic 
international markets. The second reason ensured that Japan was protected from external 
aggressors. Therefore, it did not have to risk domestic upheaval attempting to create a 
separate military to address possible external aggressors. Additionally, when the Chinese 
tested their atomic bomb in 1964, Japan was confident in the United States’ ability to 
deter any Chinese attack. 
 Although the revision to the security treaty in 1960 caused the most contested and 
violent debates amongst the Japanese public and political leaders, the ratification of the 
Mutual Treaty for Security and Cooperation strengthened the alliance between the United 
States and Japan. It was through the strength of the alliance, during the period from 1949-
1964, that Japan was able to minimize its involvement in regional affairs and concentrate 
on evolving into the world’s second largest economy. Because it wanted to maintain and 
improve on its status, Japan decided not to develop a nuclear weapons program. 
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III. CASE STUDY II: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY 
OF 1970 TO 1976 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the period of 1970-1976, Japan was once again faced with the decision to 
develop nuclear weapons. In 1970, Japan signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); 
however, it was not until 1976 that Japan ratified the document. This chapter will answer 
why the debate over signing the NPT caused Japan to once again consider developing 
nuclear weapons. Specifically, what were the political, economic, and social factors that 
fueled the debates and why did Japan eventually decide not to develop a nuclear weapons 
program during this period? 
In order to answer these questions, one must understand what fueled the debates 
that surrounded the NPT issue. Those who argued that Japan should ratify the NPT and 
therefore forego the development of nuclear weapons had done so for multiple reasons. 
First, a non-nuclear Japan ensured stability in the Far East region by not presenting itself 
as a threat to a nuclear People’s Republic of China (PRC).70 Second, the United States 
and Japan reaffirmed their alliance, and subsequent U.S. security responsibilities, by 
extending the 1960 Treaty for Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1970.  Third, the 
Guam—or Nixon—Doctrine of 1969 compelled by U.S. engagement in Vietnam, also 
shaped security thinking in Japan.  The Nixon Doctrine afforded U.S. assurances to allies 
in the region against nuclear threats; however, it asked allies to do more to provide for 
their own defense in conventional capabilities.71 It formed the nuclear umbrella of 
deterrence for Japan, without the need for Japan itself to possess nuclear weapons—
although this was a main point of discussion in the Japanese Defense White Paper of 
1970.  Fourth, in 1975 Japan became a member of the G-7, establishing its place among 
the world economic leaders.72 Having gained a prominent international position of 
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equality sought since the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons could jeopardize this status and Japan’s image as a cooperative and peaceful 
nation. Finally, the fifth reason supporters for the ratification of the NPT argued that, 
aside from economic ventures, Japan should maximize a positive impression on the 
international community in the form of Comprehensive Security. This initiative was 
developed by Prime Minister Ohira and implemented under Prime Minister Suzuki in the 
late 70’s and early 80’s. The premise of this initiative was used to explain the importance 
of building international confidence in the areas of diplomacy, energy security, second 
order cybernetics, and greater transparency of financial markets.73  
Conversely, those against ratification of the NPT argued that it restricted Japan’s 
ability to grow and evolve. Japan had developed into a political and economic world 
power. However, it was not considered a “superpower” because of its non-nuclear 
status.74 If Japan signed the NPT, it would ensure itself a position within the international 
community that was not commensurate with its actual capabilities. Some Japanese 
questioned the credibility of the United States security guarantees and whether or not 
they would actually defend Japan in a nuclear conflict—or a conflict that might lead to 
the use of nuclear weapons. Some Japanese questioned the NPT’s ability to reduce 
current nuclear stockpiles and prevent future nuclear-aspiring states from proliferating. 
Why should Japan sign a treaty that would prevent it from developing a means to defend 
itself if everyone else possessed nuclear weapons? 
The focus of this chapter is that, despite the arguments against the ratification of 
the NPT, the incentives to remain a non-nuclear power and ratify the NPT outweighed 
the incentives to develop a nuclear weapons program. This decision was based on a series 
of political, social, and economic issues that influenced Japanese policy makers during 
this period. These factors were represented by Japan’s “Four Nuclear Policies”: (1) the 
peaceful promotion of nuclear energy; (2) the support for nuclear disarmament; (3) the 
belief in extended deterrence from the United States; and (4) the support for the Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles. This chapter will draw out the specific political, social, and 
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economic factors that formulated these policies, convinced Japan to ratify the NPT, and 
subsequently prevented Japan from developing nuclear weapons. 
B. POLITICAL FACTORS 
 Not long after the 1964 China atomic bomb test, Japanese political leaders were 
once again compelled to reconsider their current and future stance on the development of 
a nuclear weapons program. In 1970, Japan reluctantly became a signatory member of the 
NPT, largely because of U.S. pressure. However, instead of quickly ratifying the 
document, Japanese political leaders commenced a series of debates that lasted six years. 
The eventual ratification of the NPT in 1976 was prompted by numerous policies, 
reports, documents, and treaties that solidified Japan’s non-nuclear stance. This section 
will state the purpose of each policy, report, document, or treaty and how they persuaded 
Japan to abstain from developing nuclear weapons and ratify the NPT. 
1. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
The United States was concerned about the fact Japan had not signed the U. N. 
endorsed NPT in 1968 after its negotiation. The lack of immediate signature was because 
Prime Minister Sato was attempting to regain control of Okinawa. To do this, Prime 
Minister Sato eventually signed the NPT, but also concentrated on courting the Johnson 
administration by publicly supporting U.S. policies during Vietnam and allowing the 
access of U.S. aircraft carriers to Japanese ports.75  
Just as important, Prime Minister Sato had to overcome a Japanese public that did 
not want an island stockpiled with U.S. nuclear weapons. The United States kept the 
weapons cache in Okinawa in case they were needed against opposing regional powers, 
as in the case of China, or instability that might stem from such countries as Vietnam or 
North Korea.76 To reassure the international and domestic community of its non-military 
intentions, Prime Minister Sato forwarded the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. It stated 
that Japan would not possess, manufacture, or permit nuclear weapons on Japanese 
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land.77 The Diet never placed them into law. However, this did not matter as the 
principles were widely accepted by Japan’s society and created the foundation for future 
nuclear weapons policies. 
2. 1968/1970 Internal Report 
 Prior to the NPT’s negotiations, an advisory board had been formed by Prime 
Minister Sato in 1967 to conduct research on the costs and benefits of Japan’s possible 
nuclearization. The board consisted of four non-governmental Japanese academics that 
specialized in either the nuclear or political science fields.78 The government conducted 
the study to determine whether the incentives to remain non-nuclear would outweigh the 
incentives to develop nuclear weapons.  
The main objectives were two-fold.79 First, Japanese political leaders wanted a 
specific list of reasons as to why Japan should remain a non-nuclear state. This list could 
be used to dispel supporters who might argue that Japan should develop a nuclear 
weapons program. The second objective was meant to convince the international 
community that Japan did not possess the capabilities or the motivation to develop a 
nuclear weapons program. 
The report was significant because it concluded that the benefits of developing a 
nuclear weapons program did not outweigh the benefits of remaining a non-nuclear state. 
It concluded that the technological, strategic, diplomatic, and political constraints were 
too great to overcome. Specifically, the report highlighted the following constraints: the 
limited nature of the Chinese nuclear threat, strategic problems associated with 
nuclearization, and diplomatic and political problems associated with nuclearization.80 
First, the Chinese nuclear weapons capabilities were considered a non-threat 
because it would exercise constraint in the face of the United States’ extended deterrence 
                                                 
77 Bullard, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms,” 850. 
78 Non-governmental academics were used because their product would be a more frank assessment of 
the costs and benefits of developing nuclear weapons. They were not constrained by the internal and 
external political red tape usually associated governmental structures. 
79 Yuri Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight in the 1968/1970 Internal 
Report,” The Nonproliferation Review 8, no. 2 (Summer, 2001): 56. 
80 Ibid. 
 37
capabilities. Second, the strategic problem associated with nuclearization was based on 
Japan’s vulnerability to a nuclear attack. When the report was conducted, 50% of 
Japanese population and industry resided in only 20% of the country. Finally, the 
diplomatic and political problems centered on the isolation Japan would experience 
through U.S. abandonment. Specifically, an isolated Japan would not only suffer from the 
loss of security provided by the United States, but would also have to contend with a 
hostile Soviet Union and China. Based on these constraints, the report recommended that 
Japan maintain its security alliance with the United States. 
3. Japan’s Defense White Paper 
The Japanese Defense White Paper of 1970 re-affirmed the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles and it also stated that Japan should not become too dependent on foreign 
countries for its security and defense.81 Japan believed in the overall moral character and 
anti-war direction of the international community that had been established by the U.N. 
However, Japan was also convinced that the complexion of the international community 
was always changing and not necessarily for the better. Japan wanted to leave itself room 
for the possible future development of nuclear weapons.  The White Paper presented the 
possibility that relations and alliances were not bullet-proof and could change for the 
worse. 
The significance of the White Paper was that it addressed possible future threats 
that could arise if the current means for security should fail; therefore, it showed the 
importance of maintaining and strengthening the current alliance with the United States. 
This was evident by the renewal of the 1960 Security Treaty a few months later. 
4. Indefinite Renewal of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
The 1970 joint communiqué signed between the United States and Japan 
consisted of fifteen clauses, but the first three are of particular importance to promoting 
stability in the region and part of that was ensuring that Japan did not develop a nuclear 
weapons program. The first three clauses were: (1) both countries agreed to maintain the 
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1960 Security Treaty in its current form; (2) the United States agreed to restore Japan’s 
administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands by 1972; and (3) the United States and 
Prime Minister Sato considered the security of South Korea very important to stability of 
the region.82  
 This was significant because despite public protests against continuing the 
alliance with the United States, Japan realized it could not guarantee its own security and 
therefore depended on the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Additionally, a relationship with 
the United States also meant it would still have favorable access to the international 
market and continue to solidify its economic position within the world. The renewal was 
also significant because the security alliance was extended indefinitely. This was good 
because Japanese leaders would no longer have to worry about negotiating a new treaty 
once it had expired and more importantly would not have to deal with the Japanese 
public. However, many thought this meant that Japan would have a harder time of 
coming out from under the wing of the United States when it chose to do so. 83 
5. Return of Okinawa to Japan 
 In 1951, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty gave complete control of the Ryukyu 
Islands to the United States. Shortly after the signing of the treaty, Prime Minister 
Yoshida stated that Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands, would become the 
biggest cause of “pain and anxiety” in the U.S.-Japanese relationship.84 It was not until 
1965 that the reversion of the islands became a major issue. This was caused by the 
Vietnam War and Japan’s desire to keep out of it. The problem existed because Japan did 
not want the United States to use Okinawa as a staging point for military operations 
because it feared a retaliatory attack would inevitably occur. Prime Minister Sato had to 
present a solution that would satisfy both: (1) the United States’ strategic thinking; and 
(2) the Japanese public.85 
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This was evident when Prime Minister Sato, under intense political and social 
pressure, put off directly dealing with the Okinawa issue by implementing a non-
committal policy.86 He focused more on a timeline for the return of Okinawa as opposed 
to how and under what circumstances it would get returned. Naturally, opposition parties 
jumped on Prime Minister Sato’s lack of commitment to the issue and forced him to 
change his policy. However, in 1969 President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato agreed on 
the basic terms of the Okinawa reversion. They included: (1) total return of Okinawa by 
1972; (2) U.S. association with Okinawa would be delineated through the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security; (3) reversion would be carried out in a manner 
consistent with the policy of Japanese government; (4) removal of nuclear weapons 
would not occur without first consulting the U.S. government; and (5) reversion “should 
not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United 
States.”87 
Finding an acceptable balance between the two oppositely positioned poles, U.S. 
strategic thinking and the Japanese public, was finally accomplished in 1972 when the 
President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato completed the final administrative jurisdiction 
turnover of Okinawa on May 15th. The Okinawa reversion was significant because it 
showed that Prime Minister Sato was very careful not to jeopardize Japan’s relationship 
with the United States by succumbing to the internal pressures that demanded the return 
of Okinawa to Japan. He carefully weighed the sentiment of the Japanese public against 
the security requirements of the United States. However, in the end, the concessions he 
made favored the United States because this ensured a better working relationship 
between the two countries. This ensured Japan would continue to benefit from the 
security provided by the United States and not develop its own defense program. 
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6. Normalization of Relations with China 
 In 1951, Japan not only signed the security treaty with the United States, but also 
signed a separate treaty with Taiwan that stated it was the officially recognized 
government of China. This action pitted the United States and Japan against Mao 
Zedong’s communist China. However, in 1970 the United States changed its negative 
stance against mainland China when it was given permanent membership in the U.N. in 
1971. Six years later, in 1978, Tokyo and Beijing signed the China – Japan Peace and 
Friendship Treaty finally normalizing relations between the two countries. 
 Japan’s normalization of relations with China was significant because in the long 
run, Japan knew it would have to deal with mainland China—regardless of governmental 
ideology. China has remained the biggest security threat to Japan since its atomic bomb 
test in 1964 and has been a catalyst for the debates concerning the development of a  
Japanese nuclear weapons program. The normalization of relations meant that Japan 
would face the threat and attempt to establish constructive political relations to prevent 
possible regional instability.88 
C. ECONOMIC/TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS 
1. Economic Factors 
Economically, Japan’s concerns revolved around three issues. The first issue was 
how the development of a nuclear weapons program would directly affect Japan’s 
established civilian nuclear program and nuclear commercial enterprises. Second, Japan’s 
economy was facing internal and external reforms. Therefore, it could not afford to spend 
vast amounts of money on the development of a nuclear weapons program. Finally, 
Japan’s lack of intentions to develop a nuclear weapons program were transparent when 
considering the decreasing amounts of money it was spending on national defense. 
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a. Limiting Internal and External Reforms 
By the late 1960’s, Japan had not only solidified its position as a 
cornerstone in the international market, but had a growth rate that some predicted would 
enable its gross national product (GNP) to eventually exceed that of the United States.89 
Japan was able to accomplish these economic gains because of large, persistent trade 
surpluses created by its highly educated and well-motivated labor force and high 
protective tariffs and other trade barriers.  In 1971, President Nixon’s New Economic 
Policy (NEP) targeted these international trade surpluses by: (1) reevaluating major 
currencies to the dollar; (2) reducing the discrimination against U.S. goods; (3) sharing 
defense burdens; and (4) creating greater flexibility in exchange rates.90 
The NEP was significant because it had come at a time when Japan’s 
economy had failed to meet projected numbers and it caused Japan to re-structure its 
economic system.91 As a result, Japan initially focused its efforts inward by reducing 
personal income taxes and passing measures to aid small Japanese firms to direct their 
efforts from export production to the domestic market.92 The government also committed 
more money to better the social infrastructure and provided more services to the public—
such as improving the national welfare system. The goal of public investment was to fill 
the void that Japan’s economy would initially experience as it addressed sectors of the 
economy that were neglected during the economic boom. 
Japan’s high growth rates could also be attributed to the fact that the yen 
was extremely overvalued against the U.S. dollar. Taking advantage of this fact, Japan 
had dramatically increased its position in the U.S. market by exporting a large number of 
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its manufactured goods. However, President Nixon’s NEP charged a 10% import 
surcharge and realigned all the world’s currencies to the U.S. dollar. But probably the 
most significant consequence of the NEP, and subsequent change in the Japanese 
economic system, was the revaluation of the yen. This brought down Japan’s growth rate 
considerably, but it soon recovered and the economic system that resulted was better 
suited to deal with changes in the international market system.93 The culmination of these 
factors meant Japan was not economically interested in developing new, unknown 
programs like nuclear weapons. 
b. National Defense Spending 
With the United States spreading its resources and presence throughout the 
region (North Korea and Southeast Asia) the need for Japan to step up its responsibilities 
was of great concern to the United States. Although Japan’s GNP had risen dramatically 
during the period 1951-1971, its rate of spending on defense had decreased.94 This fact 
supports the claim that Japan was less concerned with war and defense than it was about 
economic development. As long as Japan maintained its security relationship with the 
United States, it could continue to decrease the amount it spent on national defense. 
The following table (Table 1) shows Japan’s defense spending as a 
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(in billion ¥) 
Defense 
Expenditures 
as % of GNP 
Defense 
Expenditures 
as % of 
National 
Budget 
1951 5436.8 793.7 126.6 2.33 15.95 
1952 6236.8 923.5 182.6 2.93 19.58 
1953 7343.7 1027.3 125.5 1.71 12.21 
1954 7843.7 999.9 135.0 1.72 13.51 
1955 8785.0 1013.3 134.9 1.54 13.31 
1956 9892.4 1089.7 142.9 1.44 13.11 
1957 11206.5 1184.6 143.6 1.28 12.12 
1958 11518.2 1333.1 148.5 1.29 11.14 
1959 13377.2 1512.1 155.6 1.16 10.29 
1960 16046.9 1965.2 160.0 1.00 9.07 
1961 19307.7 2107.4 183.5 0.95 8.71 
1962 21189.7 2563.1 213.8 1.01 8.34 
1963 24726.2 3056.8 247.5 1.00 8.10 
1964 28585.8 3340.5 280.8 0.99 8.41 
1965 32650.4 3658.1 301.4 0.92 8.24 
1966 38117.9 4314.3 340.7 0.89 7.90 
1967 44801.5 4950.9 380.9 0.85 7.69 
1968 52788.2 5818.6 422.1 0.80 7.25 
1969 62433.3 6739.6 483.8 0.77 7.18 
1970 73240.0 7949.8 569.5 0.78 7.16 
1971 84320.0 9414.3 670.9 0.80 7.13 
Table 1.   Relative Importance of Japanese Defense Expenditures (In billion ¥). (From: Paul 
F. Langer, “Japanese National Security Policy-Domestic Determinants,” Rand 
Corporation (June, 1972): 64) 
From this data one can see that the amount of money spent on defense 
increased, but the actual percentage as compared to its GNP and national budget 
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decreased (one can argue that Japan’s Defense expenditure generally hovered around 
1%). This was due to an always present negative public sentiment towards the re-creation 
of a military war machine for either domestic or international purposes.96 The negative 
public sentiment was supported by the no-war Constitution and political opposition 
groups that advocated unarmed neutrality. Because of these political opposition groups, 
each with its own leader who operated semi-autonomously and diffused the amount of 
power needed to make substantial defense changes, it was unlikely that the negative trend 
in defense spending at that time would change anytime soon.97 
2. Technological Factors 
Based on the 1968/1970 Report, Japanese officials decided it was in their best 
interest to sign the treaty because they would still maintain the economic ability to 
support the development of a nuclear weapons program—if they chose to do so at a later 
date.98 Additionally, by signing the treaty, they would maintain access to the technology 
and materials to not only keep their civilian nuclear power plants operational, but 
continue to advance their nuclear weapons programs. 
However, Japan’s commercial sector was concerned about signing the NPT 
because of the effects it would have on its civilian nuclear program. Specifically, Japan 
was concerned about the inspections required by Article III of the NPT. The first issue 
under Article III states: 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept 
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s 
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fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to 
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 99 
To Japanese scientists, this Article inferred that Japan might be subjected to 
inspections requiring the shutdown of an operational reactor. The starting up and shutting 
down of reactors would lead to an inefficient use of uranium fuel and increases the 
chances that complications might arise during operation.100 Additionally, uranium costs 
money and Japanese scientists, along with Japanese businessmen, argued this was money 
that did not need to be spent. Instead, Japanese businessmen looked toward the future of 
nuclear development and the advancement of the program. The FY1967 national budget 
allotted $43 million for nuclear development. That was a 20% increase from the FY1966 
budget. Additionally, the government had promised a minimum $16 million increase for 
the following years.101 These improvements were for the addition of fast breeder reactors 
and future fuel processing plants. Both were intended to decrease Japan’s dependence on 
foreign assistance for nuclear materials and equipment by increasing the efficiency of 
their reactors while being able to develop and process their own fuel.102 
D. SOCIAL FACTORS 
The Japanese public at that time was still constrained by the psychological 
atmosphere of post-war Japan and heavily influenced by political policies and decisions. 
The aversion to war and subsequently nuclear weapons, came from the following three 
beliefs: (1) that military power was no longer the decisive factor in ensuring a nation’s 
security and that, at least for Japan such power might well be counterproductive; (2) that 
a Japanese defense buildup, even if modest, might lead to a revival of militarism and the 
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repression of civil rights; and (3) that the Japanese people did not need to fear an external 
threat so long as they sought to live in peace with their neighbors and did not provoke 
them through re-armament and foreign military entanglements.  
 As long as Japan continued to depend on the protective screen provided by the 
United States, there was not any reason to change its military posture and Japan would 
continue to develop politically, socially, and economically. More importantly, the U.S.-
Japanese security treaty solidified the three beliefs stated above. In 1960, 60% of the 
Japanese public considered the pact with the United States as having played a major role 
in allowing Japan to develop economically and socially.103 
This was reinforced by numerous opinion polls focused on the possible 
development of an offensive natured Japan.  In 1970, the Shukan Asahi conducted a poll 
asking whether or not Japan needed a great military before it could be considered a great 
nation. The results were collected from two groups, a young and old group, and were 
applied to a scale where 3 represented “can’t say,” 4 is “disagree,” and 2 stands for 
“agree.” The younger group was rated at 3.3, closer to disagreeing with the statement, 
and the older group was rated at a 2.9, closer to agreeing with the statement. 
Additionally, another poll conducted by the Japanese government in 1971 asked if Japan 
should even possess a Self-Defense Force (SDF). The negative replies to the polls broke 
the down as follows: 20 to 29 years old: 45%; 30 to 39 years old: 37%; 40 to 49 years 
old: 31 percent; 50 to 59 years old: 25%; over 60 years old: 22%.104  
The results from both of these polls were similar in that they discredited the 
beliefs made by sociologists from the mid 1960’s. They predicted that the negative 
sentiment towards rearmament and re-militarization would be replaced by a mindset that 
was removed from the nuclear atrocities experienced during World War II.105 Therefore, 
they would not have the same aversions to war and re-armament and when they came to 
prominence within society, they would make decisions without regard to what happened 
in the past. The sociologists stated that these Japanese who were too young to have been 
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psychologically affected by the war would not be affected by the same memories as their 
parents or elders. However, polls conducted in the early 1970’s asked the same questions 
concerning rearmament, remilitarization, and the nuclearization of Japan. Similar to 
previous polls, they produced the same results.106  
E. CONCLUSION 
Japan ratified the NPT in 1976, six years after its initial signing. A series of 
debates filled the six-year period as Japan decided whether or not the incentives to 
become a member of the NPT outweighed the incentives of remaining outside the treaty. 
This chapter analyzed the various political, economic, and social incentives that caused 
Japanese leaders to eventually ratify the NPT and forego the development of a nuclear 
weapons program. This chapter determined that the following factors heavily influenced 
Japanese leader’s opinions to forego the development of a nuclear weapons program. 
Politically, Japan was prohibited from developing a nuclear weapons program 
because of pre-existing treaties, alliances, documents, and policies. The U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty that was initially signed in 1951 and was re-signed in 1960 in the form of 
the Treaty for Mutual Cooperation and Security. Ten years later, the United States and 
Japan re-affirmed this treaty indefinitely. This meant that Japan could continue to funnel 
their resources towards the development of other sectors while under U.S. protection. In 
addition to the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Japan conducted its own assessment to 
determine if it was advisable for it to develop its own nuclear weapons program. The 
1968/1970 Internal Report advised that Japan strengthen its alliance with the United 
States because external and internal factors would not support the development of a 
nuclear weapons program. Therefore, Japan’s political apparatus’s future decisions were 
heavily influenced by the reaffirmation of the alliance and the results of the internal 
report. 
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Economically, Japan decided not to develop a nuclear weapons program because 
of three issues. First, Japan wanted to concentrate on the future development of its 
civilian nuclear program. The addition of technologically advanced reactors and future 
reprocessing plants would mean less dependence on foreign assistance—something it will 
always suffer from due to its limited resource capabilities. Second, few could have 
predicted the economic success Japan experienced in such a short period of time and the 
effects it would have on the internal economic infrastructure and international 
community. Therefore, few were surprised when Japan, and the international community, 
decided to focus on plans and programs aimed at reforming Japan’s economic 
infrastructure and how it interacted with the international markets. Lastly, Japan’s 
defense spending had dramatically decreased since it re-gained sovereignty in 1951. The 
trend is defense spending was unlikely to change as long as there were no-war policies 
and a public aversion towards nuclear weapons. 
Most Japanese did not believe that Japan required a military force commensurate 
with its international economic standing to be considered a great nation. Second, most 
Japanese believed that a defense buildup might lead to a revival of militarism. This in 
turn would lead to the suppression of the civil rights Japanese had worked hard to 
possess. During the period analyzed, Japan reformed not only its economic infrastructure, 
but initiated social programs that had been non-existent since the late 1920’s. Lastly, the 
development of a nuclear weapons program would only provoke additional states to do 
the same. Stability in the region was seen to be assured with a non-nuclear Japan.  
 49
IV. CASE STUDY III: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY, 
OF 1993 TO 2007 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although there was not much talk about Japan re-militarizing and developing 
nuclear weapons during the 1980’s, emerging political, economic/technological, and 
social factors contributed to the eventual debates that re-commenced in 1998 and that are 
occurring today. Japan anticipated that the end of the Cold War would bring with it a 
reduction of nuclear weapons as the sole remaining superpower, the United States, would 
usher in a period of international peace, democracy, and good will.107 Instead of 
eliminating current nuclear stockpiles, the United States had to turn its attention to an 
international landscape scarred with conflicts between India and Pakistan, China and 
Taiwan, and on the Korean Peninsula. 
The conflicts were significant because they all occurred within or near the Far 
East region. However, it was not only these specific conflicts that tested Japan’s long-
standing abstention from re-militarizing and developing nuclear weapons. In 1991, the 
United States expanded Japan’s area of concern to include the Middle East. Japan was 
reluctant to engage the Far East region, and even more reluctant to engage the 
international community, but the United States led Japan into a war it would otherwise 
have watched from the sidelines. Japan’s increasing standing within the international 
community necessitated a response proportionate to other world leaders. However, 
Japan’s actions failed to impress the international community as it addressed the problem 
through economic support alone, as opposed to diplomatic or military support.108 
These actions drew much criticism from the international community. 
Reluctantly, Japan capitulated to the wishes of the international community and began to 
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allow deployment of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to participate in peace-keeping 
operations (PKO) in Kuwait. Japan contributed military forces under the following five 
conditions: (1) existence of a cease-fire agreement; (2) an invitation from the host 
country; (3) impartiality of the operations; (4) withdrawal of Japanese forces if its 
government deemed necessary; and (5) minimum use of force required for troop 
protection.109 This conditional involvement in PKO helped to quiet the critics within the 
international community that contended Japan was not doing enough while 
simultaneously quieting the critics within its domestic community that contended Japan 
was being asked to do too much.  
However, in 1994 Japan once again openly discussed the possibility of developing 
a nuclear weapons program. These discussions were influenced by North Korea’s 
continued defiance of NPT norms and Nodong missile test in 1993.110 Additionally, 
Japan faced internal political pressures to sign an indefinite extension of the NPT. Amidst 
these debates, Japanese officials conducted another secret investigation to determine 
Japan’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons program. The study, similar to the 
1968/1970 Report, emboldened Japan’s non-nuclear position. However, the basis for the 
decision was not its lack of economic or technological support, but instead it was a lack 
of internal and external political and social support. Therefore, Japan supported the 
indefinite extension of the NPT. 
During the years of 1998 to 2007, the renewed debates over whether or not Japan 
should develop nuclear weapons recommenced after North Korea conducted missile tests 
over the Sea of Japan in 1998. In 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe enters office with a 
conservative, nationalist agenda and an apparent willingness to revise the Constitution 
and reopen the nuclear issue. Supporters for the development of a nuclear weapons 
program, such as former Foreign Minister Taro, have argued that preexisting treaties and 
alliances are no longer relevant to the current debates. Their argument is based on the 
following factors: (1) the norms and institutions established to prevent the proliferation of 
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nuclear weapons have deteriorated since Japan’s initial signature; (2) the current U.S.-
Japanese strategic arrangement—the nuclear umbrella—has holes; (3) nuclear weapons 
would provide Tokyo with the tools necessary to become a global superpower; (4) 
China’s increasing global influence; and (5) nuclear instability within the region. 
Conversely, opposition leaders, such as Hirotaka Otaki and Ichiro Ozawa, have 
argued that the development of a nuclear weapons program would do more harm than 
good. They have argued that the U.S.-Japan security alliance adequately addresses the 
concerns of a rising Chinese regional presence and instability from North Korea. 
Additionally, the U.S.-Japan security alliance ensures that Japan can continue to affirm 
its position within the international community politically and economically and therefore 
will not have to deal with external aggressors with military force. 
Similar debates that occurred three previous times in Japan’s history produced a 
nuclear-weapons-free Japan. However, the stakes of remaining non-nuclear are much 
greater today for two reasons. The first reason is that Japan has evolved into a country 
that is ready to restructure its “father-son” relationship with the United States and address 
public’s pressure for independence. Increased calls for nationalism, along with its 
economic and political stature within the international community not only warrant a 
change, supporters argue, but require it. This can be seen as Japan looks to operate 
without the assistance/guidance of the United States—as was evident when new Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe visited China before coming to the United States. The second reason 
is that the international institutions, treaties, and constitutions that ultimately produced a 
nuclear-weapons-free Japan have deteriorated in such a way that framework is no longer 
recognizable and even less effective. This can best be seen when countries like India, 
Pakistan, and Israel continue to develop nuclear programs. These cases concern Japan 
because seemingly little has been done to force the dismantlement of the programs and in 
some cases, like India, the United States has actually made provisions to advance its 
program. 
The focus of this chapter was that, despite the arguments to obtain a nuclear 
weapons program Japan will continue to abstain from developing a nuclear weapons 
program. This decision will be made despite North Korea’s continual development and 
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testing of its own nuclear weapons program and China’s increasing military presence in 
the region. The decision to abstain from developing nuclear weapons was based on a 
series of political, economic/technological, and social factors. These factors include: (1) a 
reliance on the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the nuclear umbrella it provides; (2) faith 
in the rules and doctrines of international treaties that support the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons; (3) lack of motivation by the Japanese politicians and society to accept 
the responsibilities of a nuclear state; and (4) lack of economic support due to the fact the 
Japanese economy was recovering from the Asian economic crisis of 1997. The main 
point of this chapter draws out the specifics issues in each of these factors. 
B. POLITICAL FACTORS 
The Japanese Defense Agency conducted a report in 1995 to determine whether 
the incentives to remain a non-nuclear state outweighed the disincentives to develop a 
nuclear weapons program. The following results not only explained why Japan decided to 
remain a non-nuclear state in the face of signing the indefinite extension of the NPT, but 
also help explain why Japan will remain a non-nuclear state despite the increasing 
instability from North Korea and the rising Chinese influence in the Far East region. 
The first factor that dissuaded Japan from developing a nuclear weapons program 
was the fact it would destroy the military balance in Asia and possibly prompt an arms 
race with China. This was significant because not only would it upset the military balance 
within the region, but it could increase the chances of causing a nuclear chain reaction 
that would prompt other regional countries to seek the development of their own nuclear 
weapons program. Additionally, a nuclear Japan would validate North Korea’s continued 
development of its own nuclear weapons program and justifies its open defiance of 
established treaties, laws, and norms established to prevent proliferation. For Japan to 
develop its own nuclear weapons program would also require a defiance of the same 
treaties, laws, and norms that currently attempt to control North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions. That is because the international community, specifically the United States, 
does not want to see either North Korea or Japan as a nuclear weapons state. 
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The second factor that persuaded Japan to remain a nuclear-weapons-free state 
was its role in the NPT. This was significant because Japan was the only member to have 
suffered a nuclear attack and therefore has been adamant against the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The fact that Japan has been the only state to have suffered from a 
nuclear weapons attack helps validate its reasoning for other states not to develop nuclear 
weapons—Japan can draw attention to the atrocities and the years of hardship it suffered 
as it rebuilt its cities. Additionally, as a major NPT signatory state that does not possess 
nuclear weapons, Japan can demonstrate to other nuclear-aspiring states that possession 
of nuclear weapons does not translate into political and economic success. From its 
current position within the NPT, Japan demonstrated that success can be achieved 
without a powerful military. 
But the NPT was not the only element in place to avert Japan’s proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Japan’s membership in such non-proliferation organizations as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the 
Zanger Committee helped to solidify the international non-proliferation regime. These 
agencies, coupled with treaties that sought to prevent the development of nuclear 
weapons programs and numerous nuclear-weapons-free zones, comprise a non-
proliferation regime that depends on Japanese membership.111 Again, Japan’s 
membership decreases the likelihood that nuclear-aspiring countries would follow 
through with the development of their own nuclear weapons program. 
The third factor that dissuaded Japan from developing nuclear weapons was the 
fact that it would destroy faith in the U.S. security relationship and the nuclear umbrella it 
provided the region. The nuclear umbrella not only covers Japan, but also South Korea 
and Taiwan. Many have argued that Japan’s abstinence from developing nuclear weapons 
in the past was due to the security relationship with the United States and the dependence 
on its nuclear weapons.112 Not only was this true in the past, but this fact was the biggest 
reason why Japan developed its own nuclear weapons program in the future. If Japan 
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were to develop its own nuclear weapons program, it would do so only with the support 
of the United States. Alienating the United States would not only jeopardize its future 
security (as other countries might be more apt to pick on them for not having the United 
States to back them up) but Japan would also jeopardize the economic and technological 
assistance they received because of their relationship with the United States—economic 
assistance in terms of access to the U.S. market and technological assistance in terms of 
nuclear energy.113 
The fourth factor that persuaded Japan not to develop its own nuclear weapons 
program was its belief that the United States and the region’s major players would not 
allow continued defiance and instability from North Korea. The missile launches and 
nuclear testing not only affect Japan and the region, but the whole international 
community. After North Korea declared its nuclear bomb test in October 2006, U.S. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice quickly visited China with three goals in mind. The 
first was to implement the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution (UNSCR) 1718. 
This resolution would impose sanctions against North Korea for testing its nuclear 
weapon. Although this had been used in the past, the resolution had failed to prevent 
North Korea from testing nuclear weapons because not all the countries in the region 
(China and South Korea) supported sanctions against North Korea. Conversely, those 
countries that did support the use of sanctions, interpreted the resolution differently. To 
prevent either of these issues from re-occurring, Secretary Rice explained the importance 
of all countries being on the same page.114 The region eventually understood the 
seriousness of the nuclear test as China agreed to inspect cargo ships headed for North 
Korea.115  
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The second goal of Secretary Rice was to ensure all regional members were aware 
of the United States’ security commitment to its allies. Specifically, she was referring to 
Japan because the international community was nervous of Japan’s reaction to North 
Korea’s nuclear bomb test. However, if the United States declared continued 
responsibility for Japan’s security, Japan would not have to resort to finding other means 
to protect itself—Secretary Rice was explicitly referring to Japan developing its own 
nuclear weapons program. The final goal was to revive the stalled Six-Party Talks. 
Secretary Rice met with Chinese president Hu Jintao and insisted that the United States 
wanted to find a resolution without the use of military force.116 However, in order for the 
United States and its allies to do this, she stressed how important it was for China to take 
a major role in the process. 
China responded by taking a more active diplomatic role in the negotiations. 
Additionally, China has opened communications with Pyongyang, acting as a point of 
contact for both North Korea and the international community.117 This provides an arena 
for both sides to express their wants and needs. These communication efforts have 
resulted in diplomatic negotiations that have produced a less military postured North 
Korea when dealing with the international community. More importantly, these talks 
have paved the way for energy and food support for North Korea. All of this benefits the 
international community as it increases the chances that there exists a more stable North 
Korea. Specific to China is the fact that a collapsed North Korean state would send an 
influx of refugees into neighboring Chinese territories.118 
The sanctions and group communication efforts directed towards the 
denuclearization of North Korea culminated with the declaration of a Denuclearization 
Action Plan in February 2007. This was significant because the international community 
was able to convince North Korea to cease further development of its nuclear weapons 
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program and to agree to shut down its nuclear operations at the Yongbyon nuclear 
facility. These actions, in addition to other actions specifically aimed at denuclearization, 
opened negotiation opportunities between the United States and North Korea. 
Additionally, Japan has agreed to open dialogue with North Korea aimed at resolving 
historical issues.119 
The fifth factor that prevented Japan from developing nuclear weapons during this 
period was the appointment of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. Considered a moderate on 
international affairs, said he would improve ties with Asia, maintain the U.S.-Japan 
security relationship, and provide assistance to rural areas throughout Southeast Asia.120 
But how will Prime Minister Fukuda address those international affairs that have caused 
angst throughout the Far East Asian region—specifically North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program? Prime Minister Fukuda saw the North Korean nuclear issue as a means to solve 
other issues, like the abduction of Japan citizens.121 
Prime Minister Fukuda’s appointment was significant because it represented a 
shift in how Japan would deal with international and internal affairs. Internationally, 
where former Prime Minister Abe used his inaugural world tour as a means to forcefully 
display Japan’s pressing issues, Prime Minister Fukuda took a friendlier diplomatic 
stance.122 Internally, Prime Minister Fukuda inherited a political system that is deeply 
divided and must mend the damages inflicted by the bold diplomatic practices of former 
Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe. 
The final factor that dissuaded Japan from developing a nuclear weapons program 
was best summarized by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita:  
In the 35 years since the beginning of the nuclear era, managers of the 
foreign affairs of the United States have devised two clear-cut policies that 
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defend itself from a nuclear weapons attack. They are (1) the maintenance 
of a stock of weapons and delivery systems that at least allows for  
retaliation against any potential nuclear attack and (2) the discouragement 
of the proliferation of nuclear weapons among countries hitherto not so 
armed.123 
The significance of Bueno de Mesquita quote is that even if Japan developed a 
nuclear weapons program and maintained a stockpile of nuclear weapons, it would still 
fail to possess a nuclear weapons capability that could be considered an effective 
deterrent against possible nuclear aggressors. This is because, in order to be effective, 
Japan’s nuclear weapons capabilities would have to sufficiently deter its potential 
adversaries. The idea is that if two countries involved in a conflict possess comparable 
nuclear weapons arsenals, neither country would use them out of fear of irrevocable 
destruction—the incentives to use nuclear weapons do not outweigh the disincentives.124 
To support this statement, one just has to look at geography. If a country were to attack 
Japan, the likely targets would be its industrial nodes. Because Japan is not a big country, 
it would not take a large arsenal to accomplish this task. Therefore, one can reason that 
Japan would not be able to survive a nuclear attack to attempt any organized and 
effective retaliation of its own—regardless of the amount of nuclear weapons it 
possessed.125 
C. ECONOMIC/TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS 
1. Economic Factors 
Japan faced heavy criticism from the international community that targeted the 
exploitation of their strong economic systems and how Japan responded to international 
affairs. The first issue concerned the heavy trade imbalances Japan has established with 
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its leading trading partners—particularly the United States. This was significant because 
a soured economic relationship would undoubtedly affect the U.S.-Japan security 
relationship. The second issue was the application of checkbook diplomacy when Japan 
was confronted with taking a proactive stance within the international community and its 
affairs. This section looks at how these two economic issues contributed to Japan’s 
decision not to develop a nuclear weapons program. 
a. Trade Issues 
The United States and Japan have established themselves as two of the 
world’s most vital economies. The two countries achieved this position because of a 
vigorous trade relationship based on the similar principles of economic and political 
stability and market-driven economies.126 Japan is the United States’ fourth largest 
trading partner, importing and exporting a total of $207.7 billion at the end of 2006.127 
Unfortunately, there exists a huge trade imbalance that totaled—$88.6 billion. The 
imbalance occurred because of unfair trade policies that benefited Japan. However, some 
U.S. political economists have argued that Japan just out-competed the United States 
within the international markets.128 
The United States and Japan have worked hard to overcome their 
differences and create policies that would benefit both countries. In 2005, Wendy Cutler, 
the U.S. trade representative to Japan, Korea, and ASEAN, emphasized the importance of 
settling their economic disputes and looking to do so in ways that would benefit both 
                                                                                                                                                 
125 One can argue that Japan would be able to deploy a retaliatory nuclear attack because its nuclear 
weapons cache would likely exist in hardened bunkers or on ballistic missile submarines. However, Japan 
would not be able to absorb a nuclear attack to its industrial nodes, therefore decreasing the effectiveness of 
its retaliatory capabilities. This is because an attack on the Japan’s industrial nodes would render their 
command and control systems inoperable. 
126 “U.S.-Japan Economic Ties: Status and Outlook,” Open Congressional Research Service, 30 
September 2003, http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/IB97015 (accessed 15 October 2007). The United States 
and Japan are in the top of many indexes that ranks a countries’ economy according to GDP, Income per 
captia, and PPP.  
127 “Foreign Trade Statistics: Top Trading Partners – Total Trade, Exports, and Imports,” December 
2006, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0612.html (accessed 15 October 
2007). 
128 William H. Cooper, “U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy 
Options,” Congressional Research Service, RL32649 (09 July 2007): 6. 
 59
countries.129 Japan, a country that does not easily change established laws and 
institutions, implemented a series of proposals aimed at bettering trade relations with the 
United States. The proposals include: (1) lowering retail rates for mobile telephone 
networks; (2) reducing customs processing fees; (3) liberalizing both its electricity and 
gas sectors; (4) expanding and fortifying its intellectual property rights regime; and (5) 
strengthening the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC).130 
Despite Japan’s positive actions towards correcting the trade deficiencies, 
it was concerned that the United States was not reciprocating efforts to decrease their 
economic differences. These concerns included: (1) customs regulations and practices 
implemented by the United States since September 11, 2001, that have proved 
unfavorable to Japan; (2) new U.S. government restricted regulations on the maritime 
industry placing size restrictions on foreign cargo ships; and (3) Japan’s disagreements 
with U.S. anti-dumping laws.131 
Japan understood that in order to maintain its economic position within the 
international community, it needed to smooth points of friction with the United States. It 
was not only important to highlight these points of friction. But how and where could 
these issues be resolved? U.S. policy makers presented three mechanisms. The first 
mechanism was the utilization of the World Trade Organization (WTO). One of the 
mainstays of the WTO was its ability to resolve economic disputes between countries.132 
The advantage of this mechanism was that the WTO acts as an unbiased third party. 




                                                 
129 “Signs of Progress in U.S.-Japan Trade, but Obstacles Remain,” International Information 
Programs: USINFO.State.Gov, 29 September 2005, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2005&m=September&x=20050929140954ASesuarK0.449505 (accessed 16 October 2007). 
130 Ibid. 
131 Cooper, “U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options,” 18. 
132 “Understanding the WTO,” World Trade Organization Online, February 2007, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap1_e.pdf (accessed 16 October 2007). 
 60
normally hamper current economic resolution efforts between the United States and 
Japan. This also improved the perception that the United States’ demands and requests 
were not unilaterally oriented.133 
The second mechanism was the creation of special frameworks and sector-
specific agreements. The advantage of this mechanism was that it provided economic and 
political leaders an arena to discuss issues that, if not adequately addressed, could create 
economic friction. Another advantage was that the issues discussed in these framework 
arenas were not subject to international laws.134 This was important because it allowed 
economic and political leaders to discuss issues freely and without restrictions. The final 
mechanism was the proposed creation of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The advantage 
of this option is that tariffs and other customs restrictions on U.S.-Japan bilateral trade are 
already low or non-existent, providing a foundation on which to build an FTA.135 FTA’s 
based on this framework can concentrate on issues that current economic policies fail to 
address and not worry about the restrictions that usually accompany the future execution 
of these policies. 
b. Japan’s Instruments of War 
Because of Japan’s lack of major military muscle—when compared to the 
United States or China—it has resorted to political and economic means to confront the 
issues that cause instability within the region. Diplomacy and economics have developed 
into Japan’s primary means of dealing with such issues not only within the region, but 
throughout the international community. Unfortunately, Japan’s preferred method of 
international diplomacy, coupled with its minimal military commitments around the 
world, has sometimes soured its image as a serious international player.136 This is 
because many of the world’s great powers have extended their resources—political, 
economic and military resources—to all the areas of the world. The criticism of Japan’s 
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efforts then stems from its reluctance to engage in international affairs outside of 
monetary contributions. If Japan wants to be considered one of the world’s great powers, 
then it must engage the international community in more than one facet. 
Despite its continual decline in overall Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) contributions, Japan still exists as the world largest contributor of foreign 
economic assistance. This section will analyze how Japan uses its ODA contributions as a 
tool to secure its national security despite its lack of a major military force structure. 
Japan’s ODA charter states that its main objective is to “contribute to the peace and 
development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own 
security and prosperity.”137 To achieve this goal, Japan has contributed enormous 
amounts of money to Africa, the Middle East, and throughout Asia. Examples of these 
contributions include mine clearance in Cambodia, waste management in Mongolia, 
groundwater development in Viet Nam, infrastructure improvements in Sri Lanka, and 
hospital improvement in Kenya.138 However, these examples barely cover the full 
spectrum of grants and aid Japan provides to the international community. 
Why does Japan provide so much economic support to an international 
community that criticizes its efforts for not doing enough? The significance of Japan’s 
contributions throughout the international community is that they serve as an extension to 
their current national and economic security policies. First, Japan uses ODA as a tool to 
increase its economic security and strengthen its access to markets. It does this through 
grants and aid packages to developing countries within the Far East and South East Asian 
regions. Since Japan has very limited national resources, it relies on the resources 
provided by these developing regions. By inducing trade between Japan and these 
regions, Japan secures not only resources it needs to survive, but developing trade 
partners that will eventually purchase its products and possibly evolve into international 
players. 
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In the early 1990’s, one-third of Japan’s imports came from these 
developing regions, while one-half of these regions’ exports went to Japan.139 The 
positive effects of Japan’s grant and aid packages can be seen as a number of less 
developed countries (LDC) in 1990 have become active players within the international 
economic community.140 Additionally, the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
organization and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have targeted LDC countries. 
Their goals were aimed at developing their economies so they are no longer a burden to 
the international economic community. The significance of establishing relationships 
amongst the LDC, APEC, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the 
WTO was summarized in a Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry report: 
Japan’s relations with the less developed economies have an importance 
not seen in relations with other advanced nations. Whether or not the LCD 
economies can show healthy growth has a serious bearing on our own 
economy. We cannot afford to neglect friendly economic relations with 
the LCD. Our position is that Japan’s economic cooperation is not simply 
an international responsibility but an unavoidable requirement of the 
smooth management of our own economy.141 
With regards its national security, Japan believed that political, economic, 
technological, and social preeminence overcame its lack of military power. And although 
Japan’s defense budget has grown into the world’s third largest, it still looks to its 
economic position within the international community as its strongest diplomatic tool.142 
More importantly, Japan depends on its economic position to establish trading 
relationships with the developing countries. If Japan develops these countries 
economically, this enhances the possibility of establishing additional political, trading, 
and technological alliances. As countries learn to depend on each other, it is less likely 
conflicts will arise. 
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2. Technological Factors 
By the end of the 1990’s, Japan’s civilian nuclear program was among the most 
advanced in the world. It was for this reason that Japan is referred to as a nuclear-ready or 
threshold state. However, translating civilian technologies into the development of a 
nuclear weapons program is a very difficult and complicated task. The purpose of this 
section is not to explain nuclear physics, but to discuss the fundamental components and 
technologies required to develop a nuclear program and show how one can directly apply 
the technologies involved in a civilian program and translate them into the development 
of a nuclear weapons program. 
a. Civilian and Nuclear Program Similarities/Differences 
There are three stages in developing a nuclear weapon. The first stage is 
the production, or acquisition, of weapons grade material. The second stage is the design 
and production of the warhead, integrating the plutonium/uranium core with fusing and 
explosives. Finally, the third stage mates the warhead to a delivery system. For the 
purposes of this thesis, this section will only discuss the first stage because it is the most 
complicated and difficult hurdle for Japanese scientists to overcome. 
There are two ways to produce the weapons grade material required to 
develop nuclear weapons, either by the uranium or plutonium route, with each respective 
end product serving as a possible bomb core. First, this section will discuss the plutonium 
route because it is the most likely scenario for nuclear-aspiring states, such as Japan, that 
possess nuclear reactors. A plutonium bomb is preferred over a uranium bomb because 
less material is needed to produce a small nuclear weapon—5-8 grams of plutonium 
versus 10-25 grams of uranium.143 To create the plutonium warhead, the uranium-235 is 
placed into a reactor where chain reactions occur, yielding a mixture of unspent uranium-
235, irradiated uranium-238, and plutonium 238/239. The sought-after product from the 
chain reaction is the plutonium-239, which is removed through chemical reprocessing. 
                                                 
143 Diehl and Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A Reference Handbook, 204. 
 64
Specifically, plutonium-239 of a purity of 93% or above constitutes weapons-grade 
material. Once the plutonium-239 is extracted, it is ready for Stage 2.144 
The second type of warhead use uranium-235 instead. Even though there 
are fewer steps involved, nuclear weapons based on the uranium-235 warhead are just as 
difficult to produce. This is due to the high levels of uranium enrichment required to 
produce a nuclear weapon. The goal needed for weapons grade material is to attain 
uranium enrichment over 90%.145 Fortunately, the enrichment process is extremely 
difficult and dissuades most countries from developing uranium-based warheads because 
the costs and equipment involved are too great and the IAEA makes it extremely difficult 
for states to enrich uranium to the levels required for nuclear weapons. This is important 
because it makes it harder for rogue states that possess the economic support, to hide their 
operations.146 
The warhead is denoted with either a gun-type mechanism, used on a 
uranium warhead, or the implosion method, used on the plutonium warhead. The fissile 
material is bombarded with neutrons and split into smaller, lighter elements. This 
separation causes large amounts of energy and when the subsequent smaller elements 
collide with more neutrons their separation will produce even more energy and additional 
elements. If there is enough fissile material at the beginning of the reaction to sustain the 
subsequent reactions, then the reaction is self-sustaining and this is called a chain 
reaction.147 
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b. Integration with Japan’s Capabilities 
There are similarities between the dedicated civilian nuclear programs and 
the nuclear weapons programs. They include: (1) the production of fissile material; (2) 
the handling radioactive material; (3) familiarity with chemical processes for fuel 
fabrication; and (4) the design and operation of reactor and electronic control systems.148 
However, there are also significant differences between the two programs that make it 
difficult for countries to make the transition. The major differences between the dedicated 
civilian nuclear plants and the nuclear weapons plants are the conversion of fuel, further 
enrichment of uranium (to include the production of highly enriched plutonium, weapons 
design, and testing), and reprocessing.149 However, the countries that benefit from the 
economic support of their civilian facilities have inadvertently closed the technological 
gap existing between the civilian plants and the nuclear weapons plants. Japan 
accomplished this by building more efficient and powerful reactors, enrichment 
techniques, and reprocessing plants. 
(1) Reactors. Japan possesses the economic means to translate its 
civilian nuclear technologies and infrastructure into a nuclear weapons plant. In 1992, 
Japan maintained 44 power reactors that produced 34,238 total MW (e). This accounted 
for 23.8% of Japan’s electric power. Japan currently has nine additional power reactors 
slated for construction. Additionally, Japan has 18 research reactors.150 The nine 
additional reactors and the 18 research reactors are of significant concern to the 
international community because of the type of reactors they are, or are going to be. This 
is because Japan plans on producing its first wave of Advanced Pressurized Water 
Reactors (APWR). These types of reactors pose a greater threat to non-proliferation 
because of the higher concentrations of enriched plutonium by-products, namely 
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plutonium-239, that result from the normal fission process. Additionally, Japan also 
maintains Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) that produces high concentrations 
of plutonium-239.151 Finally, Japan has discussed the construction of a Fast Breeder 
Reactor (FBR). The benefit of this type of reactor is that it possesses a more efficient fuel 
consumption cycle; therefore, it produces less waste while increasing the amounts of 
usable plutonium-239.152 It is more efficient because it consumes fissile material at a rate 
less than what it produces. 
(2) Processing and Enrichment Plants. Since the inception of 
Japan’s civilian nuclear program, it has either stockpiled the plutonium received from the 
normal fission cycle of their reactors as spent fuel, or sent it off to get reprocessed. Of 
great concern to the international community is the fact Japan has stockpiled more spent 
fuel than it has sent to reprocessing plants in Europe.153 Furthermore Japan recently 
attained the capability to reprocess its own plutonium, increasing its capability to produce 
weapons grade material. In 2003, Japan announced that it was constructing a new nuclear 
reprocessing plant, where it could draw from the growing pile of plutonium it currently 
stockpiles. This is of concern to the international community because Japan is now the 
largest producer of civilian plutonium in the world and therefore has a large amount of 
material available to produce nuclear weapons.154 Japan conducted testing on the 
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in March 2006. 
Japan argues that the facility will be used to separate the 
plutonium-239 from the fission waste and to create mixed-oxide fuel (MOX).155 
However, Japan does not currently possess any reactors that can utilize MOX; more 
importantly, the Japanese government has not approved construction of any reactors that 
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will. When the Rokkasho reprocessing facility comes online, in 2012, Japan will possess 
the means to complete the nuclear fuel cycle.156 It already maintains a large-scale 
uranium enrichment plant, which is also located at the Rokkasho site. The enrichment 
plant is capable of reprocessing 900 tons of uranium per year.157 
(3) Education. Japan’s universities have many programs and 
courses that concentrate on the science and physics required to advance their nuclear 
program. More importantly, the curriculums could also provide the foundation needed for 
a nuclear weapons program. For example, two of Japan’s major universities, Tokyo and 
Kyoto Universities, have departments dedicated to Chemical Engineering, Applied 
Physics, and Materials Engineering. Additionally, Japan’s Kyoto University has a 
department dedicated to the research, advancement, and development of Advanced 
Energy. This department is dedicated to advancing nuclear power, but not specifically 
targeted at their civilian or weapons program. However, the department does address both 
topics as is evident by their divisions in Fusion Reactor, Space Energy Systems, and 
Advanced Electric Energy Systems 158 
Additionally, Japan maintains positive relationships with such 
countries as the United States, France, and Russia. These relationships provided Japan 
with exchange programs so their scientists can keep abreast of current technologies.159 A 
way this was accomplished was through organizations like the World Nuclear University. 
This group consists of 30 delegates, of which Japan is a member and has 15 
representatives. The group discusses nuclear science in terms of energy and nuclear 
weapons. However, the discussions concerning nuclear weapons are targeted at non-
                                                 
156 “Japan to Launch Nuclear Processing Plant,” Lateline: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 03 
March 2006 http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2006/s1583771.htm (accessed 14 March 2007). 
157 “Japan’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” Japan’s Nuclear Power Program: Power for the Future 
of Japan, http://www.japannuclear.com/nuclearpower/fuelcycle/facilities.html (accessed 14 March 2007). 
158 “Graduate School of Frontier Sciences,” The University of Tokyo, http://www.k.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/index.html.en (accessed 14 March 2007). 
159 “Scientist Exchanges,” Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 
http://www.jsps.go.jp/english/e-asia/exchange.htm (accessed 12 October 2007). 
 68
proliferation.160 The World Nuclear University is supported by International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD, the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators, and the World Nuclear Association. Unlike in the past, 
Japan now has the ability to operate a full nuclear fuel cycle and therefore has the 
technical potential to build bomb of its own. 
D. SOCIAL FACTORS 
The influence of the Japanese public was illustrated in earlier case studies when 
political leaders were quickly removed from office for talking about re-militarizing or 
developing a nuclear weapons program. Similar to the previous two case studies, the 
Japanese public has remained steadfast in its efforts to remain a non-nuclear state. 
However, in contrast to the previous two case studies, the Japanese public has shown 
glimpses of change with regard to application and utilization of its Self-Defense Forces 
(SDF). This change was significant because it showed a possible shift in conceptual 
paradigms. This will section will analyze how these opposing issues contributed to 
Japan’s decision not to develop a nuclear weapons program. 
1. Influential Element 
In 1995, Japan agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT. This was significant 
because it proved that neither the international community nor the Japanese public 
wanted to debate Japan’s nuclear status. However, Japanese public sentiment soon began 
to change in 1998 when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. This was significant 
because Japan had just agreed to an indefinite extension of an international document 
aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. When India and Pakistan tested 
their weapons, the international community’s reaction was not what Japan had 
anticipated. Although the two countries were heavily criticized, Japan was disappointed 
that significant actions were not taken to dismantle the two programs. Suddenly the 
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number of nuclear Asian countries went from two to four.161 This infuriated Japanese 
officials and public and the debates over whether or not Japan should reconsider its 
policy on nuclear weapons had resurfaced. 
Despite the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan and other issues like North 
Korea’s missile tests, the Japanese public was still against a change to its nuclear 
weapons posture. In 1999 the Asahi Shimbun conducted a poll that focused on whether or 
not the Japanese public agreed to changes in the guidelines that dictated the U.S.-Japan 
security alliance. The poll specifically targeted guidelines that changed Japan’s Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles. The poll showed that 43% of the respondents (a majority) 
disagreed with the guidelines that would change the posture of Japan’s Three Non-
Nuclear Principles.162 Additionally, former Vice Minister of the Defense Agency, 
Nishimura Shingo, was forced to resign because of statements he made in an interview 
stating that “the Diet should consider whether Japan would be better off if it armed itself 
with nuclear weapons.”163 His statements questioned the foundation of Japan’s defense 
policy—the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. More important was the reaction of the 
Japanese public. It demonstrated that the anti-nuclear sentiment was still alive and well. 
In September 2006, Shinzo Abe was appointed Prime Minister and the 
international community anxiously waited to see how Prime Minister Abe’s hawkish 
views would address the external security threats stemming from China and North Korea. 
Their concerns stemmed from the fact Prime Minister Abe has historically taken a hard 
line against issues dealing with North Korea; specifically, the North Korean abduction of 
Japanese citizens.164 Even more alarming was the fact Prime Minister Abe had stated that 
Japan, based on its Constitution, possessed the right to develop nuclear weapons. 
However, Prime Minister Abe quickly quelled international and domestic concerns of a 
possible offensive nuclear response to either situation when he stated that Japan had no 
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intentions of straying from the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and “we [Japan] absolutely 
do not have the option of owning nuclear weapons.”165 However, this did not prevent 
debates over whether or not Japan should develop its own nuclear weapons from 
occurring. 
Another poll was conducted by Nippon Television (NTV) and asked respondents 
whether or not Japan should debate the development of a nuclear weapons program. The 
poll came as a response to Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Policy Research Council 
Chairman Shoichi Nakagawa when he stated that Japan should consider developing 
nuclear weapons following North Korea’s missile tests. The results were as follows: 47 
percent of the respondents said that the debates should occur while 22 percent “did not 
see a strong reason for such discussions.”166 However, it was the open support for 
Nakagawa by Foreign Minister Taro Aso that created the greatest amount of public 
protest. Although Foreign Minister Aso attempted to pass the situation off as “simply 
floating the idea that there might be some benefit to discussing the possession of nuclear 
arms for security reasons,” he was promptly removed from office.167 
2. Possible Changing Sentiment 
The Japanese government has tried to refute the argument that a country must 
possess a superpower military to be considered a superpower state. Evidence of this claim 
was seen in how Japan uses its economic position within the international community to 
address international affairs. Specifically, Japan is the world’s biggest contributor of 
ODA. In the past, Japan had been reluctant to engage itself outside of its natural borders 
and that could be due to the public’s perception that continued international engagement  
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would likely push Japan to achieve a military status commensurate with its economic 
status.168 This was far from the case as Japan would rather provide financial support 
compared to military support. 
An example of this was in Gulf War I when Japan only provided financial support 
to the U.S. led multinational forces. Japan had initially offered $2 billion and eventually 
approved an additional $5 billion. However, U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady 
insisted that Japan provide an additional $10 billion. The justification for this sum was 
based on the amount of money Japan provided to the Middle East for ODA and MITI.169 
However, some argued that the United States requested the increased amount of money 
because Japan refused to provide diplomatic or military assistance to the Gulf War effort. 
Japan ended up providing $13 billion, or 20% of the entire cost of Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm combined.170 
Gulf War I was significant because it was the catalyst that made Japan reconsider 
how it traditionally dealt with foreign policy. Japan realized that it could no longer 
substitute money for diplomatic or military resources when asked to engage in 
international affairs. If Japan wanted to be considered a major player within the 
international community, a change in its foreign policy was required. But before Japan 
could change its foreign policy, it first had to convince its domestic community that 
changed was required. To do this, Japan’s government turned to the U.N. 
The U.N. was an organization that promoted international stability through peace 
keeping operations. Japan’s government convinced its domestic constituency that a more 
active role in U.N. sponsored PKO would lead to regional stability and therefore 
increased national security.171 The Japanese public accepted this line of reasoning as the 
Japanese government “massaged” its Constitution to allow the SDF to carry out U.N. 
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operations. Since 2005 Japan’s SDF has participated in eight U.N. PKO in such countries 
as Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, the Golan Heights, and Timor-Leste.172 
In the eyes of the domestic public, the purpose of allowing the SDF to participate 
in U.N. PKO was that it raised Japan’s political profile in international affairs, won 
greater international respect for Japan in that it was finally willing to engage in 
international affairs, and presented Japan an opportunity to gain a seat on the U.N. 
Security Council.173 In the eyes of the international community, the fact Japan had 
released its SDF for PKO meant that Japan, specifically its public, was slowly shedding 
its fears of re-militarizing to become an international leader. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Japan agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT because the political, social, 
and economic incentives to remain a non-nuclear state outweighed the incentives to 
become a nuclear power. The decision to remain a non-nuclear state had come in the face 
of increasing instability from North Korea as it continued to conduct missile tests and 
openly defy the international institutions and laws aimed at promoting stability and 
peace. Specifically, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 to continue to develop 
its own nuclear weapons program. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. 
Additionally, Japan had to contend (politically, economically, and militarily) with rising 
powers within the region. China and India have evolved as two powers that are not only 
competitors in the region, but have established themselves as competitors in the world. 
This chapter determined that the following political, economic, and social factors heavily 
influenced Japanese leader’s opinions to forego the development of a nuclear weapons 
program. 
Politically, Japan was prohibited from developing a nuclear weapons program 
because of pre-existing treaties, alliances, documents, and policies. However, an 
increased call for nationalism, instability in the region, and rising external military 
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powers caused Japan to question whether or not its existing security measures would 
indeed work. Similar to the Internal Report conducted in 1968/1970, Japan conducted 
another secret report in 1995 to determine whether or not it should develop its own 
nuclear weapons program. The results of the report stated that the advantages of 
remaining a non-nuclear state outweighed the advantages associated with becoming a 
nuclear power. 
Therefore, Japan made the decision to remain a non-nuclear state based on the 
following factors: (1) a nuclear Japan would disrupt the military balance in the region, 
perhaps provoking a nuclear arms race; (2) a nuclear Japan would undermine the basic 
principles of the NPT; (3) a nuclear Japan would ruin its relationship with the United 
States and subsequently ruin relationships with its allies; (4) a nuclear Japan would not 
exist as a practical nuclear deterrent against other nuclear members; and (5) the 
international community would contain North Korea’s unstable actions and China’s 
rising military; and (6) the appointment of a more moderate Prime Minister. 
Economically, Japan not only wanted to retain its unlimited access to international 
markets, but it wanted to use its economic standing within the international community as 
a diplomatic tool to ensure its continued economic security. Additionally, Japan wanted 
to strengthen its existing national security alliance with the United States. Japan’s 
decision not to develop a nuclear weapons program was affected by two economic issues. 
First, for Japan to continue to depend on the United States for its national security, it 
needed to overcome the friction that had arisen between the two countries because of 
trade imbalances. The trade imbalances that favored Japan led to accusations and trade 
restrictions. However, the real fear amongst Japanese politicians was that the economic 
troubles between the two countries would bleed over into their political and security 
relationships. To alleviate these fears, the two countries have engaged in vital talks aimed 
to rectify their current economic challenges. The success of these talks have met minimal 
success, but they are still working in the right direction 
The second economic issue was Japan’s use of its economic standing within the 
international community to engage developing countries. Japan’s purpose for doing this 
was twofold. First, Japan was heavily criticized by the international community for only 
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committing financial resources to world problems. However, Japan did not possess 
military power like its superpower counterparts and, more importantly, its internal 
documents and treaties did not allow for the creation of a military force to tend to 
international issues. Therefore, Japan opted for a foreign policy that centered on 
economic diplomacy versus military diplomacy. This meant that Japan sent money 
instead of troops to deal with international affairs. 
The second reason why Japan focused on developing countries was to strengthen 
its economy while ensuring its national security. Japan is a country of scarce natural 
resources and fortunately, the developing countries to which Japan provided grants and 
aid possess the resources Japan needs to operate and survive. Therefore, establishing 
trade between Japan and the LDC’s provides economic relationships and leads the way to 
possible future diplomatic alliances. The international community recognized the 
importance of these economic relationships and soon organizations like APEC, ASEAN, 
and the WTO engaged the LDC’s because of the economic stability brought to the Asian 
region. 
Socially, Japan has shown a slow metabolism when trying to digest change. 
During this period, one could see how Japan’s society remained consistent when dealing 
with internal affairs. However, when dealing with international affairs, one can start to 
see a gradual change. Internationally, Japan’s perception of its military and the 
employment of its small forces have changed. Japan’s domestic community understands 
that in order for it grow within the international community; it has to take a greater role in 
its affairs. Japan does not maintain a huge military force and its checkbook diplomacy 
was no longer an acceptable way for an aspiring superpower to deal with international 
affairs. To address the changing environment, Japan amended its constitution to allow its 
SDF to deploy on U.N. PKO’s. This satisfied both the international and domestic 
communities because Japan was now taking a more proactive role outside of its borders 
even though it limited the SDF’s engagement to non-offensive operations. 
Despite Japan’s willingness to yield to international pressures to take a more 
proactive role within the international community, Japan’s domestic community refused 
to yield to the internal pressures to develop a nuclear weapons program. Foreign Minister 
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Aso learned this lesson firsthand when he stated that Japan should think about developing 
nuclear weapons. Similar to his predecessors that also argued for the possible 
development of a nuclear weapons program, Foreign Minister Aso was promptly 
removed from office. It was evident that, despite Japan’s ascendancy to world leader 
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V. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 
This thesis will present four policy options based on Japan’s current political, 
economic, and technological capabilities. The advantages and disadvantages of each 
policy option will be addressed in order to produce a coherent strategy that U.S. policy 
makers could implement in seeking to address future security pressures in Japan. The 
policy options are as follows: (1) the United States keeps Japan under the nuclear 
umbrella with no Japanese military buildup except missile defense; (2) the United States 
supports the strengthening of Japan’s SDF into a strong conventional military force; (3) 
the United States supports the development of a Japanese nuclear weapons program; and 
(4) Japan is allowed to go its own way, without input from the United States or the 
international community.174 
1. Analysis of Proposed Policy Options 
The first policy option maintains Japan’s security concerns under the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella without major shifts in Japan’s conventional capabilities. This means that the 
United States maintains responsibility for Japan’s security and defense. This is the 
current state of affairs between the two countries and enables them to continue working 
towards developing a common defense and military strategy—specifically the Theater 
Missile Defense (TMD) system. The advantages of this option include: (1) the two 
countries maintain favorable relations and continue to advance economically, militarily, 
and politically; (2) Japan retains its position as a prime role model of the NPT; (3) Japan  
 
 
                                                 
174 The advantages and disadvantages will be listed for each policy option and are not all inclusive. 
However, the ones listed are the most important because of how they fuel current debates or how they 
influence foreign policies. Many of the advantages and disadvantages overlap between policy options; 
therefore, this paper will explain the specifics of each advantage and disadvantage for the single policy 
option chosen. 
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maintains access to current materials and technologies to advance their civilian nuclear 
power plants; (4) the United States keeps its bases in Japan; and (5) Japan will not be 
committed to any additional treaties. 
The disadvantages of policy option one include: (1) United States must continue 
to spend money to protect Japan; (2) the two countries would likely maintain the current 
father-son relationship; and (3) there will continue to be debates concerning the U.S.-
Japan security alliance. 
With the second policy option, the United States supports the strengthening of 
Japan’s SDF into a strong conventional military force. The advantages of policy option 
two include: (1) the SDF assumes a greater responsibility in the Far East region; (2) the 
United States could decrease its presence in the Far East region; (3) Japan improves its 
perception outside of Asia by accepting greater responsibilities for collective security; 
and (4) Japan receives the respect commensurate with its political and economic status. 
The disadvantages of policy option two include: (1) the possible perception that 
Japan is attempting to re-militarize and return to its formerly aggressive policies; (2) the 
difficulty that is involved with changing the Constitution in order to justify strengthening 
a military for self-defense purposes and possible external combat missions—although, 
this would likely only occur under a U.N. flag; (3) the possible provocation of regional 
states, prompting them to increase their military forces; and (4) the prompting of regional 
states to counter a rising Japanese conventional military force—specifically referring to 
states developing nuclear weapons programs. 
With the third policy option, the United States supports the development of a 
Japanese nuclear weapons program. This would be a joint U.S.-Japan venture and the 
other relationships shared between the two countries would continue to grow. This option 
would also require the United States to allow for the remilitarization of Japan. The 
advantages of policy option three would include Japan achieving a position within the 
international community commensurate with its economic and political status and 
possible help to the United States in deterring China’s nuclear forces. 
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The disadvantages of policy option three include: (1) Japan’s loss of its prestige 
linked to its non-nuclear-weapons policies; (2) the development of a Japanese nuclear 
weapons program is likely to promote the spread of nuclear weapons in the region by 
creating an Asian arms race; (3) a Japanese nuclear weapons program would likely fail to 
balance China’s physical mass, potential nuclear arsenal, and much larger and more 
dispersed population; (4) the continued U.S.-Japan partnership will provoke heightened 
Chinese and Korean rearmament; and (5) a nuclear Japan could lead to Russian 
redeployments in the Far East.  
With the final policy option, The United States breaks with Japan and it decides to 
develop an independent nuclear weapons program without the support or permission 
from the international community. The only advantage of this option is that Japan would 
no longer be suppressed by the father-son relationship and Japan would finally be 
recognized as a major player within the international community, albeit as a possible 
pariah state. However, this would be detrimental to the United States and its vital 
presence in the region. Additionally, a Japan with nuclear weapons—especially outside 
the restraining effects of the U.S-Japan alliance—would drive a bigger wedge between 
itself and other regional powers like China, the Korean Peninsula, and Russia. 
Fortunately, the Japanese have recognized the disadvantages of pursuing their 
own nuclear weapons program in the past and therefore are unlikely to do so in the 
future. These reasons include: (1) the international community would discontinue support 
for the Japanese civilian nuclear program; and (2) a nuclear Japan would ruin established 
ties with its existing allies and threaten trade relations. Not only does the United States 
provide for Japan’s security, but the two countries depend heavily on each other 
economically. Japan is the United States’ top export partner and its number two import 
partner.175 Also, Japan is a group of islands with few natural resources and depends 
heavily on imports from the international community. By developing nuclear weapons, 
Japan understands it would sever ties with many members within the international 
community that provide it with needed resources. 
                                                 
175 “Japan Economy – 2007,” Federation of American Scientists, 02 February 2007, 
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/japan/japan_economy.html (accessed 12 March 2007). 
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2. The Selected Policy Option 
Based on the policy options covered, this thesis supports a combination of policy 
options one and two. Under policy option one, Japan remains under the nuclear umbrella 
provided by the United States. Policy option two supports the strengthening of Japan’s 
SDF into a stronger but still largely defensively oriented conventional military force. 
Supporting both of these options ensures that both the United States and Japan continue 
to benefit from pre-existing political, economic, and social alliances. Additionally, these 
two options provide the best means for Japan to address regional and international 
pressures.  
If the United States supports policy option one, both countries can continue to 
advance the strategic partnership and Japan’s TMD system. This option is favored over 
the others because it addresses the instability in the Far East region and rising military 
from China but not in provocable manner. Moreover, this option has gained popularity 
amongst U.S. policy makers.176 The United States and Japan maintain their established 
relationships and can continue to advance economically, militarily, and politically.177 
These relationships have evolved since their inception at the end of World War II. Then, 
the United States could heavily influence the direction that Japan would likely take. The 
initial father-son relationship was important after World War II because it was a major 
reason for Japan’s current successes that it benefits from today. It was able to concentrate 
on rebuilding its political, social, and economic sectors and let the United States take 
responsibility for its defense. 
For example, economically, the key partnership shared between the United States 
and Japan was recently reaffirmed in the so-called Economic Partnership for Growth with 
an objective to “promote sustainable growth in both countries as well as the world by 
addressing such issues as sound macroeconomic policies, structural and regulatory 
                                                 
176 “Theatre Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 2001, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_3a.html (accessed 11 March 2007). 
177 Kazuo Ogoura, “Improving Japan-Russia Ties,” The Japan Times, 04 June 2007. Just as important 
as maintaining a relationship with the United States is the fact it must also maintain treaties and 
partnerships with its allies. Japan has many treaties with such world powers as the European Union, China, 
and Great Britain and recently has recently resumed the Japan-Russia Forum.  
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reform, financial and corporate restructuring, foreign direct investment, and open markets 
and by providing a structure for cooperation and engagement on bilateral, regional, and 
global economic trade issues.”178 Politically, the two countries combat such issues as 
terrorism, human rights, social injustice, and piracy. But today Japan can take on more 
responsibility without threatening its economy and it should be encouraged to do so in a 
gradual manner. 
Japan would also maintain its status and position within the NPT. Being the only 
country that has lived through the horror of a nuclear attack, Japan carries considerable 
influence when it comes to convincing potential proliferators to refrain from developing 
nuclear weapons. Japan has demonstrated that a country can succeed politically and 
economically without the assistance of nuclear weapons. The United States and the rest 
of the international community depend on Japan to set this example. 
Under this scenario, Japan also maintains access to the materials, technology, and 
equipment to help supply its civilian nuclear power plants. To Japan, this is important for 
reasons stated earlier, but from a U.S. perspective, this ensures that Japan stays under the 
watchful eye of organizations like the IAEA. With the huge amounts of plutonium Japan 
has stockpiled, a lapse in controls could be dangerous.179 Additionally, Japan will 
continue to work with the United States and develop a strategic alternative to a Japanese 
nuclear weapons program—for example, the TMD system. 
The combined policy option acknowledges Japan’s newly established and 
responsible role within the international community and the fact it will continue to evolve 
and prosper. With the United States taking this pragmatic stance, its footprint in the 
region and Japanese national affairs are not increased. Policy option one, on its own, fails 
to address some internal and external elements that insist Japan provide a greater role, 
specifically militarily, in international affairs. With policy option two, the Japanese SDF 
                                                 
178 “U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 30 June 
2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-american/us/pmv0106/joint_e.html (accessed 09 March 2007). 
179 At the end of 2004, Japan had 43.1 tons of plutonium, 29.3 tons was fissionable. The international 
community takes this seriously as it only takes a couple of kilograms to make a nuclear bomb. “Japan’s 
Plutonium Stockpile Tops 43 Tons,” PhysOrg.com, 08 September 2005, 
http://www.physorg.com/news6316.html (accessed 15 October 2007). 
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can assume a greater role in collective security and self-defense. It would provide a 
means for Japan to attain international respect because it would no longer shun 
international affairs. Although the deployment of SDF for U.N. PKO was a major turning 
point in how Japan dealt with international affairs, it was still heavily criticized for not 
doing more. If Japan wants to be considered a great power within the international 
community, it must engage the international community in a way that is commensurate 
with its political, economic, and technological capabilities while also setting a good 
example of responsible behavior reflective of its special role and identity as a non-nuclear 
weapons state. By strengthening Japan’s SDF into a strong conventional military force, 
Japan would have the ability to assume a larger role in not only the Far East region, but 
also the international community. 
Currently, the Japanese SDF provide for Japan’s security by performing naval 
perimeter patrols with ships and submarines. Additionally, the Japanese Navy also 
conducts P-3 flights over and around the Japanese islands. The military maintains its 
proficiency by engaging in allied naval exercises and studies abroad at military 
universities. These facts are significant because they show that Japan has the leadership 
and force structure to expand its military efforts throughout the Far East region. If Japan 
is able to assume a larger military role, then the United States could eventually decrease 
its presence in the Far East region. This is significant because many have argued that the 
large U.S. footprint in Far East Asia is a major reason why states like China feel the need 
to develop a significant military force of their own.180  
A decreased U.S. military presence in the Far East region would free up military 
resources that could be allocated to current trouble spots in the world—specifically, the 
Middle East. This option now seems more feasible, as North Korea has recently signed an 
agreement stating that it will terminate its current nuclear weapons aspirations. Therefore, 
Japan’s remaining regional security threat would be China. Even though China’s military 
forces and capabilities continue to grow, a decreased U.S. military presence does not 
                                                 
180 “Why Does U.S. Preach China Military Threat?” People’s Daily Online, 15 June 2005, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/15/eng20050615_190420.html (accessed 22 November 2007). 
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mean that the United States would forfeit its basing and port privileges. The United States 
would still maintain a strong influence in the region.  
The advantages of merging the two policy options to create a single option 
provides U.S. policy makers with an overall plan to maintain current relationships while 
planning for future change and expansion. However, there are disadvantages for the 
proposed policy option that must also be addressed. The first disadvantage is that the 
United States must continue to spend large amounts of money to support its current 
military and strategic interests in Japan.181 
The second disadvantage with the proposed policy option is that it does little to 
refute the debate that asserts the United States wants to maintain its already large 
footprint in the region and Japanese affairs. But as stated earlier, the United States wants 
to formulate a policy that enables the Japanese SDF into assume a greater role in the 
region. This is an actually an example where less of a U.S. presence would be required to 
provide security in Japan. 
The third disadvantage of the proposed policy option is the perceived re-
militarization of Japan. If Japan is perceived to re-militarize, it could cause regional 
countries like Taiwan and South Korea to follow their lead because of not wanting to be 
the only countries to exist in a region dominated by larger militaries that would now 
include Japan. Additionally, the re-militarization of Japan could legitimize North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program. This is because nuclear weapons could prove to be an 
attractive equalizer against a superior Japanese conventional military force. Finally, the 
re-militarization of Japan could prompt Russia to re-assume military positions throughout 
the Far East region to protect its buffer zones. 
For this reason, this combined policy option must be pursued carefully and in 
concert with regional confidence-building measures. On Japan’s part, transparency in its 
doctrine, dialogue, and military expansion effort is key to ensure its full intentions are 
understood. For this to occur, open dialogue must occur at all levels (Track One and 
                                                 
181 Chris Prebble, “Two Normal Countries: Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship,” Cato 
Institute: Policy Analysis 566 (18 April 2006): 1. 
 84
Two) amongst involved states. This could include talks between foreign delegates, 
consulates, and foreign advisors to discuss issues relevant to all of the countries involved. 
Additionally these talks would emphasize Japan’s defensive (not offensive) orientation 
and its focus on strengthening collective security in Northeast Asia. Additionally, 
unofficial talks, out of the scrutiny of the public eye, could produce discussion on specific 
problems. The results of these talks could be forwarded to the leaders that negotiate at the 
Track One level and could also be used to encourage more regional talks like the Asian-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) and Six-Party Talks. Finally, the role of 
the United States in helping to manage this transition would be important. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Given the state of Japan following the atomic bomb droppings on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, few would have envisioned Japan as it stands today. Through a series of 
documents, treaties, and alliances created in the post-World War II period, Japan has 
fully integrated itself into the bipolar system. Since the end of the Cold War, there are 
emerging multipolar pressures for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. However, Japan’s 
current nuclear policy has proven the predictions of two neo-realists—Kenneth Waltz and 
John Mearsheimer—wrong. This thesis discovered that two overarching themes have 
emerged to explain why Japan abstained from developing nuclear weapons in the past 
and, as importantly, why Japan is likely to continue to abstain from developing nuclear 
weapons in the future. The two themes are: (1) the U.S.-Japan security alliance; and (2) 
the unique will of the Japanese people to remain a non-nuclear state. 
In the first case study, the alliance with the United States can be explained by 
Waltz’s neo-realist paradigm because Japan was forced to bandwagon with an existing 
power, the United States. This not only ensured Japan’s national security, but also made 
it possible for Japan to concentrate on rebuilding its war torn political, economic, and 
social structures. This was significant because the U.S.-Japan security alliance produced 
subsequent alliances that led to the rapid political and economic industrialization Japan 
experienced towards the end of the first case study. It was for these reasons that Japan 
decided not to develop nuclear weapons during this period. 
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In the second case study, Waltz’s neo-realist paradigm began to lose its relevance 
as Japan had evolved into a significant political and economic player within the 
international community—it was no longer just a strategic regional foothold of the United 
States. Although Japan still relied on the United States for its national security, it was 
beginning to associate itself more with the institutional norms established by the NPT and 
the U.N. Additionally, the unique will of the Japanese people was becoming more 
prominent during this period and beginning to assert itself as a major influence upon 
Japanese politicians. The anti-nuclear sentiment that originated during the first case study 
was now a force focused on preventing the international proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Also, the will of the public was now a significant political factor in persuading Japanese 
policy makers to not develop a nuclear weapons program. 
In the third case study, a desire for great power status and emerging regional 
threats convinced some proponents to argue for the development of a nuclear weapons 
program. This argument represented even more of a shift in conceptual paradigms, as 
achieving this status would mean that Japan would have moved out from under the wing 
of the United States and would have attempted to sit as an equal with it and other nuclear-
armed states on the international stage. 
The threat of a nuclear North Korea, a possibly weakening U.S.-Japan security 
alliance, and a rising China made it difficult to argue against Japan developing its own 
nuclear weapons program. However, the other side of the debate argued that a system 
now existed where the U.S.-Japan security alliance had become institutionalized into a 
“collective security” mindset in Japan. Similar to how the NPT and the U.N. have 
established themselves as institutional norms that strive to achieve a non-nuclear world, 
the U.S.-Japan security alliance has evolved into an institutional norm that provides the 
framework for ensuring regional stability. Therefore, the unique identity and non-nuclear 
will of the Japanese people is critical in supporting this trend. 
1. Will of the Japanese People 
Constructivist theory helps explain how the will of the Japanese people produced 
a non-nuclear state. Constructivists argued that a state’s interests and behavior are 
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influenced by its identity. Additionally its perceived place in the international community 
is developed and affected by its interactions with other states. Based on this conceptual 
approach, Japan rejected nuclear weapons because the will of the Japanese people has not 
allowed it to do so. Japan was the only country to experience and live through the effects 
of a nuclear weapons attack. Because of this fact, Japanese society has developed an anti-
nuclear sentiment in hopes of preventing the same tragedy from occurring again. The 
strength of this sentiment stems from a Japanese political apparatus that continues to 
assimilate the emotional factors of its society into policy by choice. The strength of the 
Japanese identity has actually grown across the three case studies and, despite the 
external and internal influences that are pushing for change, it is unlikely to capitulate in 
the near future. 
The atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima not only devastated and 
destroyed the physical infrastructure of Japan; but more importantly, it devastated and 
destroyed the mental psyche of the Japanese society. Even though Japan was able to 
rapidly reconstruct the physical damage inflicted on Japan, the negative Japanese 
sentiment against nuclear weapons still remains today. This was evident as endless polls 
were conducted by Japan’s leading newspapers. The Asahi Shimbun newspaper 
conducted polls in 1968, 1978, 1981, and in 1998 asking the Japanese public if they 
supported Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. The results and significant threats during 













1968 21 68 Chinese Nuclear Test 
1978 15 73 NPT Signature 
1981 16 71 Oil Crisis 
1998 10 86 1998 DPRK Missile 
Tests and Nuclear 
Ambitions 
2006 18 80 DPRK Nuclear Test 
Table 2.   Japanese Opinion Concerning a Nuclear Japan182 
One would think that the external threats and pressures directed towards Japan’s 
security would translate into increased support for nuclear weapons; however, just the 
opposite is true. Table 2 shows an overall decline in support for a nuclear Japan in the 
face of significant security threats. Table 2 indicates that in 2006, there was a slight 
increase in public for support for the development of nuclear weapons. But this was due 
to the time the poll was conducted. Following North Korea’s nuclear test in October 
2006, the Angus Reid Global Monitor asked 1,757 Japanese whether or not Japan should 
uphold its Three Non-Nuclear Principles or consider reviewing the principles for possible 
change.183 It is likely that this figure has now declined. 
The Japanese public’s willingness to speak out against the development of nuclear 
weapons influenced the Japanese political apparatus. During each case study at least one 
high-ranking Japanese official stated that either Japan should consider the development 
of nuclear weapons, or possessed the ability to do so. Both types of statements raised 
concern domestically and elicited strong public calls for their repudiation. Accordingly, 
such Japanese political leaders as Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Shoichi Nakagawa 
eventually had to resign or be removed. 
                                                 
182 Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Won’t Go Nuclear (Yet),” PhD. dissertation. (Department of 
Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004), 19. 
183 “Japan Rejects Possession of Nuclear Weapons,” Angus Reid Global Monitor: Polls & Research,” 
21 November 2006, http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/13872 (accessed 17 October 2007). 
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2. Today’s Debates Will Not Produce a Nuclear Japan 
This thesis proposed that the incentives associated with becoming a nuclear state 
might now outweigh the incentives associated with remaining a non-nuclear power. 
However, the recent debates have once again produced a nuclear-free Japan. This 
conclusion was based on analyzing three case studies and identifying the enduring 
political, economic/technological, and social factors that have led Japan to reject nuclear 
weapons even in the face of its vastly more advanced economy, greater technological 
capabilities, and the emergence of new security threats. 
Each time the nuclear debates have occurred, the will of the Japanese people to 
remain a non-nuclear state has only gotten stronger. This is especially true despite a 
rising Chinese state (politically, economically, and militarily) and an unstable North 
Korea. The strength of the Japanese public’s resolve stems from: (1) a belief in its 
identity as a non-nuclear state; and (2) established norms and institutions that over time 
have evolved into a framework for regional stability and a basis for the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. As long as such elements as the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Japan’s unique anti-nuclear-weapons identity remain 
intact, there is no reason to believe a nuclear-armed Japan will emerge. 
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